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 Abstract 
Many people today have an iPhone, iPad or iPod.  Not many would realize 
that valuable information is stored on these devices.  When a crime occurs, an iOS 
Device could hold key information to help solve said crime that criminals are not 
aware are present on the device.  This can include GPS information as well as 
application history on the device itself.  
The project I wish to do and complete is to create a class where students 
can learn the about iOS Forensics.  Student will be able to learn the basics of an 
iDevice, as well as how to work with forensics tools to acquire the information in 
an efficient manner. The class will also introduce forensic tools that can be used 
with iOS Devices.  These tools can include Open Source and Commercial 
forensic tools.   This class will be offered to both Graduates and Undergraduates 
at Governors State University. It will act as a beginner’s class, for individuals 
who want to learn more and have an interest in iOS Forensics.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
  IOS devices are becoming a bigger part of everyday life.  Many people in 
the world have an iPhone, iPod or iPad.  These devices can hold a wealth of 
information.  This information can include contacts, pictures, Short Message 
Service (SMS) messages and much more.  Many users may believe that once 
something is deleted off the device, it is gone forever. Just like in computer 
forensics, deleting an item does not mean that it is gone from the device.  The 
item can be retrieved from the device. This can be important for evidence that can 
be held on the device and can be used in investigations if the opportunity is 
provided.  
 Like any field in digital forensics, there are certain procedures and 
strategies that need to be known to extract the data in a safe and efficient manner.  
A person cannot just go into a computer and break their way into it to gain the 
information an investigator would need.  This is the same for iOS devices.  It is 
important for individuals to know the correct ways to access this data on the 
device.   
 This report will discuss the class that was created for Governors State 
University, which is called iOS Device Forensics.  This class will give an 
introduction to iOS Forensics for individuals that are interested in this subject.  
For the book chosen for this class was Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka’s book 
iPhone and iOS Forensics: Investigation, Analysis and Mobile Security for Apple 
iPhone, iPad, and iOS Devices.  The following chapters in this report will express 
2 
 
what will be covered in each section or chapter, as well as what was learned in 
each section. 
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Chapter 2 – Methods  
 The materials used to find the information for the class was primarily the 
apple development library1, Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka’s book iPhone 
and iOS Forensics: Investigation, Analysis and Mobile Security for Apple iPhone, 
iPad, and iOS Devices and information that was provided through discussion with 
Dan O’Day.   Some informative websites were also found for additional 
information.  All materials are included in the bibliography at the end of this 
report.  
 From the information that was provided or found, PowerPoint 
presentations were prepared for eleven weeks.  These presentations then cover 
material that would be in that week’s class.  The students that participate in the 
class will also become familiar with the tool iPhone Analyzer, which can be found 
at crypticbit.com.   
 The class will also include a final project, will have students doing a hands 
on project. The students will be able use what they have learned to retrieve data 
from a device or backup. This project will take up the last three weeks in the 
semester. Once finished with the project, students will then be able to present 
their work for other classmates. 
Undergraduate vs Graduate 
It should be understood that there will be an undergraduate section and a 
graduate section for the class.  The graduates that will be in this class will have to 
1 (Apple) 
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complete a paper as part of their grade. The paper has a few options that the 
student can choose from.  One of these choices is the student will chose a tool in 
iOS device forensics to research on.  They will give details on where the tool was 
found, what the tool is able to do and how the tool is unique.  Another topic that 
the student may choose is to pick a feature on the new iOS 8 and explain the pros 
and cons for it.  Students will explore the feature and give insight on how this 
feature could be of use in a digital forensics investigation.  
Chapter 3 – Week One: Introduction to iOS Forensics 
 This is the first week of class for the students. This is the time that the 
students will be able to go over the syllabus and ask any questions that they would 
have.  This week will also touch on why these devices are important.  As stated 
before, these devices have the capability to store valuable information that could 
be of use in investigations.   
 Students will also be able to learn about the different iOS versions that 
have been offered up to the point of today’s current version of iOS, which is iOS 
8.  Students will also learn about the different models for iPods, iPads and 
iPhones. Forensic artifacts, which are known as something that would be of 
interest, are discussed along with the difference between Logical2 and Physical3 
Acquisitions.  The difference between technical analysis and ‘Forensic’ 
examination is.   
2 Copying the active file system from a device into another file.  
3 A physically bit-by-bit copy of the file system that is created.  
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 A technical analysis is used to authenticate data through explanation of the 
technical features of the data.  A ‘Forensic’ Examination attempts to understand 
the evidence that is found from the acquisition. In simpler terms, the analysis 
explains how to get the evidence whereas an examination determines whether or 
not a conclusion of guilty or not guilty.  
PowerPoint Presentation for Week One 
Slide 1 
iOS Device Forensics
Introduction to iOS Forensics
Week 1
 
Slide 2 
Syllabus
 Syllabus can be found on blackboard. 
◦ We will be going over the syllabus in class. 
 Other readings can also be found on 
blackboard. 
 
Slide 3 
Importance of iOS Devices
• Why do you think iDevices are important?
• Many people store personal data on their 
iDevices, including email, contacts, messages, 
photographs and videos. 
• A criminal could store valuable evidence on their 
device. A few examples of this would be:
• GPS data
• Photographs from a scene
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Slide 4 
Prevalence of iOS
• According to the wall street journal article by  
Rani Molla,  Apple has already sold 130 million 
iPhone in Quarter 3 filings.
• http://blogs.wsj.com/numbers/is-iphone-6-
apples-most-popular-model-lets-ask-google-
1755/?mod=WSJBlog
• These numbers do not include iPads or iPods!!
 
Slide 5 
iOS Versions
• iOS 1.x
• Came with the first iPhone
• Release in 2008
• Originally named iPhone OS, but was changed 
to iOS in 2010. 
• Last update was 1.1.5 back in 2008. 
• iOS 2.0
• Released in 2008 with the iPhone 3G. 
• This version introduced the App Store. 
• Available for both iPhone and iPod Touch. 
• Last update was 2.2.1 back in 2009
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_iOS#iPhone_OS_1.x  
Slide 6 
iOS Versions Continued 
• iOS 3.x
• Released in 2009. 
• Supported iPhone (1st generation), iPhone 3G 
& 3GS and iPod Touch (1st and 2nd generation).
• Last update was 3.2.2 back in 2010. 
• iOS 4.x
• Released in 2010. 
• First major iOS release that was available to 
iPod touch users for free. 
• Supported iPhone 3G & 3GS, iPhone 4, and 
iPod Touch (2nd & 3rd).
• Last update was 4.3.5 back in 2011. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_iOS#iPhone_OS_1.x  
Slide 7 
iOS Versions Continued
 iOS 5.x
◦ Released in 2011
◦ Supported iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4 & 4S, iPod Touch (3rd
and 4th Generation), iPad (1st generation)  and iPad 2.
◦ Last update was 5.1.1 in 2012
 iOS 6.x
◦ Released to the public in 2012.
◦ Supported iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4 & 4S, iPhone 5, iPod 
Touch (4th and 5th generation), iPad 2, iPad (3rd and 
4th Generation) and iPad Mini (1st generation).
◦ Last update was 6.1.6 on February 21, 2014
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_iOS#iPhone_OS_1.x  
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Slide 8 
iOS Versions Continued
• iOS 7.x
• Released in 2013
• Supported iPhone 4 & 4S, iPhone 5, 5C & 
5S, iPod Touch (5th Generation), iPad 2, iPad 
(3rd & 4th generation) and iPad Mini (1st
generation).
• Final release was June 30, 2014. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_iOS#iPhone_OS_1.x  
Slide 9 
iOS Versions Continued
• iOS 8.x
• Most recent version of iOS. 
• Announced June 2, 2014.
• Will support iPhone 4S, iPhone 5C, 5S, 
iPhone 6, iPhone 6 Plus, iPod Touch (5th
generation), iPad 2, iPad (3rd & 4th
generation), iPad Air, iPad Mini (1st & 2nd
generation)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_iOS#iPhone_OS_1.x  
Slide 10 
iPhone Models
 These years are when the device was discontinued. 
Final OS Version Year
iPhone 3.1.3 2008
iPhone 3G 4.2.1 2010
iPhone 3GS 6.1.6 2012
iPhone 4 7.1.2 2013
iPhone 4S - 2013
iPhone 5 - 2013
iPhone 5C - -
iPhone 5S - -
iPhone 6 - -
iPhone 6 Plus - -
There are no final 
OS versions for 
iPhone 4S and 
higher because 
they can still 
receive software 
updates. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_iOS_devices  
Slide 11 
iPod Models
Final OS Version 8GB 16GB 32GB 64GB
1st Generation 3.1.3 2008 2008 2008 -
2nd Generation 4.2.1 2010 2009 2009 -
3rd Generation 5.1.1 2010 - 2010 2010
4th Generation 6.1.6 2012 2013 2013 2012
5th Generation - - - - -
Only the 5th Generation is still receiving updates 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_iOS_devices  
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Slide 12 
iPad Models
Final OS 
Version
16GB 32GB 64GB 128G
1st Generation 5.1.1 2011 2011 2011 -
2nd Generation - March 
2014
2012 2012 -
3rd Generation - 2012 2012 2012 -
4th Generation - - - - -
iPad Air - - - - -
iPad Mini (1st Generation) - - - - -
iPad Mini (2nd Generation) - - - - -
Find more details about these devices here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_iOS_devices
 
Slide 13 
Forensic Artifacts of Value
• What is a forensic artifact?
• Also known as a digital artifact, it is the device 
that is being looked at. 
• i.e., Computer, email message,  hard drive, iDevice
• A Forensic Artifact would be something that 
you would find of interest. 
• In the case of a crime, it would be an odd message 
or incriminating photograph. 
• So what are some forensic artifacts of value in 
iDevices?
• GPS Data
• Deleted Photographs
• Deleted emails that are supicious
 
Slide 14 
Logical vs Physical Acquisition
• Logical Acquisition
• Copying the active file system from the device 
into another file. 
• Page 119,  iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew 
Hoog
• 1st technique often used by Analysts.
• Some tool that use logical acquisitions will also 
provide a reporting system. 
• Problem with the reporting system may be 
that the examiner can view the data, but not 
view the source. i.e., you can see the website, 
but not the date and time it was visited. 
 
Slide 15 
Logical vs Physical Acquisitions
 Physical
◦ This type of acquisition is similar to how a 
hard drive is forensically imaged. 
 A physical bit-by-bit copy of the file system is 
created.  This provides more data to be examined, 
including deleted data. However, they are more 
difficult to execute.
 We will discuss Physical Acquisitions in 
more detail in week 9.
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Slide 16 
Technical Analysis vs ‘Forensic’ 
Examination
• Technical Analysis is used to authenticate data 
through explanation of the technical features of 
data and future usage.  
• It is the way to explain how to get the 
evidence 
• A ‘Forensic’ Examination attempts to understand 
the evidence that is found from the acquisitions.
• It includes more then just the technical 
data found through analysis. It is using the 
evidence and understanding it to get a 
conclusion.
• i.e., guilty or not guilty. 
 
 
Chapter 4 – Week Two: iDevice Hardware 
 In week two, students will become familiar with the hardware in an 
iDevice. Most iPods, iPhones and iPads have a solid state drive.  This drive is 
called a NAND flash.  What this drive does is it uses memory to store the data, 
rather than having an actual drive in the device.  The hardware section also 
includes file systems that are stored on the device.  Most iDevices will use a 
HFS+ type file system. This is important to know because this is where the data 
can be contained.   
 There is a folder4 within the file system that is discussed that allows the 
user to see the folders containing Application, Library and Media.  The 
Application folder contains the applications that are stored on the device.  The 
media folder contains all the pictures, videos and other media type data on the 
device. The library may have the most useful data. This folder contains the 
address book, calendar, favorites, mail, and messages.  
4 /private/var2/mobile 
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 Students will learn about the disk partitioning scheme of an iDevice in this 
week as well.  The device has two partitions.  The first partition contains the 
firmware, where the second partition contains the data.  Encryption is discussed, 
from version iOS 3 to iOS 8.  Students will also learn about the operating modes.  
The modes include Normal, Recovery and DFU.  The presentation slides also give 
students insight on how to access these modes. The presentation concludes with 
telling students what the difference between a soft reset, which doesn’t lose data, 
and a hard reset, which resets the entire device. 
PowerPoint Presentation for Week Two 
Slide 1 
iOS Device Forensics
iDevice Hardware
Week 2
 
Slide 2 
Physical Storage
 All data stored on internal NAND flash
 NAND review:
◦ Limited P/E cycles, page must be erased by 
writing all 1’s
◦ Wear leveling applies, but thanks to 
encryption, file carving is often a waste of 
time
iPhone and iOS forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, p 37
Information Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
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Slide 3 
File System 
 Most iOS runs a version of OSX and 
HFSX. 
◦ Most useful information is stored in 
/private/var2/mobile/ .
◦ Other information can be stored in database 
folders.
◦ iOS uses SQLite and plist to store 
information. 
 We will discuss plist and SQLite in week 4.
http://www.eadatahandlers.co.ke/services/mobile-phone-forensics-services/ios-forensics.html
 
Slide 4 
File Systems Continued
 The /private/var2/mobile contains three 
folders that will be useful:
◦ Application
◦ Library
◦ Media
http://www.eadatahandlers.co.ke/services/mobile-phone-forensics-services/ios-forensics.html
 
Slide 5 
File Systems 
 Application
◦ Contains apps stored on the phone.  This 
includes the name of the app and where it is 
stored in the iTunesMetadata.plist
 Media
◦ Contains all Pictures/Videos taken, books, 
purchases, podcasts, recordings and photos 
loaded onto the phone.
http://www.eadatahandlers.co.ke/services/mobile-phone-forensics-services/ios-forensics.html  
Slide 6 
File Systems 
 Library 
◦ Contains the most useful information! This 
includes: 
 Address Book
 Calendar
 Favorites
 Mail
 SMS (SMS Databases which can include deleted SMS 
messages)
 Notes
 Etc.
http://www.eadatahandlers.co.ke/services/mobile-phone-forensics-services/ios-forensics.html
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Slide 7 
Disk Partitioning Scheme
 The iphone is configured with two disk 
partitions.
◦ First is on the system (firmware) partition.
 When you upgrade your firmware, this partition is 
updated. 
 Takes up a small portion of storage space on the 
device. 
 Read-only be default, except during software 
upgrades. 
 Partition is formatted by iTunes and does not affect 
any of the user data. 
iPhone and iOS forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 75  
Slide 8 
Disk Partitioning Scheme
◦ Second is the data partition (also known as 
“slice 2”)
 Takes up the most space on NAND. 
 Most, if not all, evidentiary data can be found. 
 Information found on this partition can be:
 Default applications
 Applications downloaded through iTunes App Store
 Stored Data
 Once you have a forensic image, you can rename 
the it as a “.dmg”
iPhone and iOS forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 75  
Slide 9 
Disk Partitioning Scheme
 Both partitions can be imaged and analyzed, 
user data is what is typically acquired. 
 According to Dan O’Day, this is where to 
find the partitions:
◦ /dev/rdisk0 = entire disk
◦ /dev/rdisk0s1 (Slice 1) = firmware partition 
(IPSW)
◦ /dev/rdisk0s2 (Slice 2) = user data partition 
(what we want)
 This information was provided by Dan O’Day in his 
Introduction to iPhone 4n6 presentation.
 
Slide 10 
Encryption
 The following information was also provided by Dan O’Day
and his iPhone forensics presentation. 
◦ iOS 3 (3GS): device-level
◦ iOS 4/5:  Introduction of Encryption. File System Key (encrypts 
entire file system). Also uses Class Key (separate encryption for 
each file).
◦ iOS 6: dedicated AES-256 key/crypto engine for each device 
(hardware layer), kernel / memory ASLR (between flash storage 
and main system memory) and data protection with passcode 
(software layer, apps must opt-in and ensure data not shared).
◦ iOS 7: data protection on by default (full encryption at hardware 
and software layers). However, still needs a passcode. 
◦ iOS 8: Same protection from iOS 7.  Includes automatic VPN, and 
uses a randomized MAC address when not associated with a 
wireless network. 
 http://arstechnica.com/apple/2014/09/apple-expands-data-encryption-
under-ios-8-making-handover-to-cops-moot/
Information Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1302613-ios-security-guide-sept-2014.html  
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Slide 11 
Encryption 
 Good News though!
 File system is mostly unlocked once device is 
booted up
 Baseline encryption is NOT tied to passcode/PIN
 Data protection is, however - but only if 
passcode/PIN enabled!
 According to arstechnica.com, with iOS 8, even 
with a warrant, Apple is unable to gain entry into 
the device. It is protected by the user’s passcode. 
◦ Need the passcode to get the information.
Information Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
http://arstechnica.com/apple/2014/09/apple-expands-data-encryption-under-ios-8-making-handover-to-
cops-moot/  
Slide 12 
Operating Modes
 Normal Mode
◦ Every day use of the device
 Recovery and DFU
◦ To perform certain functions, must place 
device in device failsafe utility (DFU) or 
recovery mode
◦ Bypasses loading of OS
◦ DFU mode = black screen
◦ Recovery mode
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 37
Some of the Information was provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
 
Slide 13 
Operating Modes 
 Recovery mode
◦ Power off device
◦ Hold down Home button and plug in while 
holding
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 37
Some of this information was Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
 
Slide 14 
Operating Modes
 How to verify your in DFU mode:
◦ DFU mode = black screen
◦ Connect device and ensure powered off
◦ Hold down Power + Home for about 10 seconds
◦ Release Power, but continue holding Home for about 
10 more seconds
◦ Release Home button (screen should now be black)
◦ Mac Terminal command: 
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 37
Some of this information was Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
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Slide 15 
Operating Modes 
 Hold Power + Home till you see Apple 
logo (reboot)
◦ What if stuck in recovery loop?
 Use iRecovery (cf. 
http://theiphonewiki.com/wiki/IRecovery & 
https://github.com/iH8sn0w/irecovery)
./irecovery –s
setenv auto-boot true
/exit
 Reboot device
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 37
Some of this Information was Provided by Dan O’Day, intro2iphoneforensics.pdf
 
Slide 16 
Operating Modes
 Soft Reset
◦ To do a soft reset, hold the Home Button and 
Sleep/Wake Button for ten seconds. You will get 
the apple icon and the phone will restart. 
◦ No data will be lost. 
 Hard Reset
◦ Removes files from the phone. Like a clean slate 
for your device. 
◦ When going into your device’s settings, there is 
an option for a “reset.” This is for the hard reset 
we are talking about. 
 
Slide 17 
Reminder!!!
 For Graduate Students, please turn in 
your Abstract for your paper next week, if 
you have not done so yet.  
 
 
Chapter 5 – Week Three: iOS Operating System 
 This presentation will go into iOS 7 and iOS 8.  These two operating 
systems are the most used, with iOS 7 quickly being replaced with iOS 8.  The 
operating system for an iOS device has four main layers: the Core OS, Core 
Services, Media and Cocoa Touch.  
15 
 
 The Core OS contains low-level features.  These features can include 
networking and Memory management.  Along with these features, the framework 
and keychain services are found in this layer of the OS.5  Keychain services work 
with certificates on the device.  
 Core Services are responsible for holding the technologies to support 
certain features. A few of these features include Location, iCloud, Social Media 
and Networking. As in the Core OS, Keychain Services are also implemented in 
this layer.  To put simply, Keychain services allow data storage and protection 
within the keychain database that is on the device.6  The Media layer7 of the 
device holds the graphics, audio and video technologies for the device.  This is 
good to know in a forensics setting. That is because some evidence that can be 
found on an iOS device can be video, picture, audio or a combination of one or 
more of these areas.  
 The last layer is the Cocoa Touch8.  This layer contains the infrastructure 
for how the device looks.  This can also include information on multitasking, push 
notifications and touch-based input for the device. What is meant by touch-based 
input is the device recognizing when a user touches the screen on the iDevice.  
The framework for the user’s Address Book can also be found on this layer. 
5 (Apple, 2014)  
6 (Apple, 2014) 
7 (Apple, 2014) 
8 (Apple, 2014) 
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 The presentation slides for this week touch on the differences between iOS 
8 and iOS 7.  IOS 8 has more capabilities in photo editing and notifications are 
also easier to manage.  IOS 8 also has some new features, which include 
HealthKit and the new Apple Pay system.  The week concludes with a glimpse 
into Third Party Applications.  Third Party Applications are applications that are 
not apple approved. The two locations were applications can be stored, 
/var/mobile/Application and var/stash/Application, are shown to the students.  A 
device normally has to be jailbroken (which will be discussed in week 8) in order 
for these types of applications to be installed.  
PowerPoint Presentation for Week Three 
Slide 1 
iOS Device Forensics
iOS Operating System
Week 3
 
Slide 2 
Operating System
 The last two operating systems (OS) that 
has been used in iOS have been iOS 7 and 
iOS 8. 
 Not a lot of iDevices still use anything 
under iOS 7. 
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Slide 3 
Operating System
 There are many layers to iOS, which is 
simliar to the Mac OS.  
 The layers we will focus on at the 
moment are:
◦ Core OS
◦ Core Services
◦ Media
◦ Cocoa Touch
 
Slide 4 
Operating System
 Core OS
◦ This layer contains low-level features, such as 
networking, access to external accessories, and 
memory management/file system handling.
◦ Framework can be found in this layer, which will deal 
with Security or Communication with external 
hardware. 
◦ Helps the Core Services layer’s Keychain Services by 
creating and managing certificates. 
 https://developer.apple.com/Library/ios/documentation/Miscell
aneous/Conceptual/iPhoneOSTechOverview/CoreOSLayer/C
oreOSLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40007898-CH11-
SW1
 
Slide 5 
Operating System
 Core Services
◦ Contains the fundamental system services that 
applications use. 
◦ This is mainly C-based. Why?
 To allow file access and low-level data types. 
◦ Important services are Core Foundation and 
Foundation Frameworks. Why?
 They define the basic types that all applications use. 
◦ Also contains individual technologies to support 
features for:
 Location
 iCloud
 Social Media
 Networking
 
Slide 6 
Operating Systems
 Core Services Continued 
◦ Security Services are also found on this layer. 
 This includes Keychain Services. What are keychain 
services?
 Keychain Services are used to implement data storage and 
cryptographic function within the keychain database on the 
device. 
 Along with security services, we can find that data 
protection is in this layer, among other important 
features in the iphone. 
◦ https://developer.apple.com/Library/ios/document
ation/Miscellaneous/Conceptual/iPhoneOSTechO
verview/CoreServicesLayer/CoreServicesLayer.ht
ml#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40007898-CH10-SW5
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Slide 7 
Operating System
 Media 
◦ Where we find the Graphics, Audio and Video 
technologies for the device. 
◦ In this layer, we can find the framework for 
the Photo Library,  Media Player Framework 
and Core Graphics.
◦ For devices using AirPlay, we can find 
information on this in this layer. 
 https://developer.apple.com/Library/ios/documentati
on/Miscellaneous/Conceptual/iPhoneOSTechOvervi
ew/MediaLayer/MediaLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid
/TP40007898-CH9-SW4
 
Slide 8 
Operating System
 Cocoa Touch
◦ This layer contains the technologies that 
provide the infrastructure for how your 
device looks.  
◦ This layer also provides the key technologies 
such as multitasking, touch-based input, push 
notifications and other high-level system 
services. 
◦ Another feature that can be found on this 
level is editing information with the Standard 
System View Controllers. 
 
Slide 9 
Operating System
 Cocoa Touch Continued
◦ A lot of frameworks for basics can be found in 
this layers. These frameworks include:
 Address Book
 Message UI
 Notification Center
 Twitter
◦ https://developer.apple.com/Library/ios/document
ation/Miscellaneous/Conceptual/iPhoneOSTechO
verview/iPhoneOSTechnologies/iPhoneOSTechnol
ogies.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40007898-
CH3-SW1
 
Slide 10 
Operating System
 iOS 7
◦ Information about the changes in iOS 7 when 
it came out can be found on the apple 
website:
 http://support.apple.com/kb/DL1682
 iOS 8
◦ A lot of the information on iOS 8 can be 
found on the apple website:
 https://www.apple.com/ios/
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Slide 11 
Operating System
 What does iOS 8 have that iOS 7 didn’t?
◦ Besides the new HealthKit and Pay system, 
there are a few other differences. 
 Through iCloud Drive, users now a Dropbox type 
way to access files on your phone through your 
computer. 
 More Editing Capabilities with photos. 
 Notifications are easier to manage. 
 More differences can be found here:
 http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/features/apple/3533759/ios-7-vs-
ios-8-comparison-review/
 
Slide 12 Third Party Applications and Data 
Storage
 What is a Third Party Application?
◦ A third party application is an app that was not 
developed by Apple, but is for an iDevice. 
◦ What are some third party applications?
 Jasmine instead of YouTube
 Tweetbox instead of Twitter
 You can find more examples of third party applications at:
 http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/10-awesome-third-party-apps-their-ios-
7-updates/
 https://www.bart.gov/schedules/appcenter#
 Without a jailbroken phone, it is sometimes 
difficult to get to where the stored data is on a 
iDevice.  We will discuss Jailbreaking in week 8. 
 
Slide 13 Third Party Applications and Data 
Storage
 There are two locations you can find where 
applications are stored:
◦ /var/mobile/Application/
 The folder will give a strange name, and is known to 
change randomly.  If there are a lot of apps, it can be 
time consuming to go through each folder. 
◦ Var/stash/Applications
 Contains pre installed applications on the device.  These 
include the App Store and Maps. 
 They don’t have the strange folder structure as the 
previous.  Easy to get through. 
 http://www.iphone-tips-and-advice.com/locate-iphone-
applications.html
 
Slide 14 Third Party Applications and Data 
Storage
 So how to get to the files and apps?
◦ There are many tools that can assist in finding 
these applications. A few examples of some of 
these tools are:
 iFile
 Cydia (for jailbroken phones)
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Slide 15 Third Party Applications and Data 
Storage
 Not only are third party applications 
important to know, but also known apple 
apps.
 For instance, Snapchat can ask you to link 
your address book to the application, 
allowing you to find friends. 
◦ This sends your address book to their server to 
be seen, which may not be such a good thing.
 http://thenextweb.com/insider/2012/02/15/what-ios-
apps-are-grabbing-your-data-why-they-do-it-and-what-
should-be-done/
 
Slide 16 Third Party Applications and Data 
Storage
 Another example would be Facebook 
Messenger’s privacy issues.
◦ It was said that the application was tracking 
information and monitoring your activities on 
your device. 
 http://www.cbc.ca/newsblogs/yourcommunity/2014/09/fa
cebook-messenger-found-to-be-tracking-a-lot-more-
data-than-you-think.html
◦ More recent information about this can be found 
here:
 http://bgr.com/2014/09/11/facebook-messenger-app-
privacy/
 
 
Chapter 6 – Week Four and Week Five 
 Weeks four and five both deal heavily in SQLite, which is a version of 
Structured Query Language (SQL).  SQL will be discussed in more detail within 
week four’s summary. 
Week Four: Common File Types 
 Week four begins with an explanation of Property Lists (plist) and Binary 
Property Lists (bplist). A property list, or plist, are data representations used to 
store, organize and access various data types on the device, according to the apple 
developer library. A Binary Property List, or bplist, is similar to plist. The file size 
is condensed by storing certain files in binary.  This allowed the application to run 
more efficiently. The data that can be found in plists are strings, number, binary 
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data and dates.  To traverse this data, it is good to know SQLite9, seeing as this is 
a well-known database that iOS devices tend to use.  SQL is known to be a 
relational database management engine and, according to sqlite.org, is the most 
widely deployed database engine.    
A relational database means that it contains tables.  These tables then have 
a Primary Key, which is a unique identifier for a record. These tables also have a 
Foreign Key, which shows a relationship between records on different tables. This 
is the basic structure for this type of database.  The tables then have different 
types of data that can be stored.  These data can be identified as NULL, Integer10, 
Real11, Text12 or BLOB13. The lecture continues to give students examples of 
how to do queries in SQLite with a table. One-To-One relationships and One-To-
Many relationships are explained in this week’s lecture as well, along with 
examples. An example for a JOIN, which joins the two tables to gain a result, is 
given to students to help understand how it works.  
PowerPoint Presentation for Week Four 
Slide 1 
iOS Device Forensics
Common File Types
Week 4
Information for these Slides were provided by Dan O’Day, htcia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
 
9 A part of SQL 
10 Signed integer, 1-8 bytes 
11 Floating point value, 8-Byte IEEE 
12 Text string, encoded UTF-8 or 16 
13 Binary large object 
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Slide 2 
File Types - Property Lists
 Property Lists
◦ Property Lists, also known as plists, are 
structured data representations used to store, 
organize and access various data types on the 
iDevice, as stated in the apple developer library.
◦ There is a heirarchy for these lists which include 
3 classes:
 Cocoa Foundation
 Core Foundation
 XML
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
 
Slide 3 
File Types – plist
 So what does these classes do?
◦ For XML, according to iPhone and iOS 
Forensics (our text book): 
 “When a plist is created in XML format, an 
application is then able to read from it, while at the 
same time converting the XML properties into 
their appropriate objects to be used in both the 
Cocoa and Core Foundation (Apple INc., 2010)” –
iPhone and iOS Forensics, Hoog
 In other words,  XML is able to be read by the 
application, then be converted by the device to be 
displayed properly. 
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
 
Slide 4 
File Types – plist
 Nice thing about XML is that the file can 
be viewed by using any standard text 
editor. 
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
 
Slide 5 
File Types – Binary Property Lists
 The file size was reduced by storing certain 
preference files in binary. 
 For some applications, this was done to 
make the application more efficient.  
 These are called the Binary Property lists 
(bplist).
 Example:
◦ Repeated values within a file need to be stored 
only once and can be later referenced. 
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
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Slide 6 
File Types - bplists
 In bplists, the XML portion of the plist
must be opened by an application that can 
convert it to ASCII. 
◦ An example of a type of program that can 
open these plists are  Plutil (property list 
utility). 
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
 
Slide 7 
File Types - plist
 What data can be found in plists?
◦ Various kinds which can include:
 Strings
 Numbers
 Binary data
 Dates
◦ On page 64 of Andrew Hoog’s book, Table 3.1 
shows how various data types are 
represented to each class. 
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
 
Slide 8 
File Types – plist
 On the iPhone, plists are used by on the 
device n order to present options to the 
users.  
 Example:
◦ Safari Web Browsing
◦ Safari Bookmarks
◦ YouTube Data
◦ Favorites
https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLists/AboutPropert
yLists.html
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/AboutInformatio
nPropertyListFiles.html
 
Slide 9 
File Types – plist and bplist
 A good reference to turn to for plist and bplist, 
look into the CCL Forensics presentation on 
“Property Lists in Digital Forensics.” 
 Another good reference would be the Property 
Guide and Information Property List Key 
Reference found in the iOS Developer Library
◦ https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentatio
n/Cocoa/Conceptual/PropertyLists/AboutPropertyLis
ts/AboutPropertyLists.html
◦ https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation
/general/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/Ab
outInformationPropertyListFiles.html
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Slide 10 
File Types - SQLite
 What is SQLite?
◦ SQL = Structured Query Language Lite
◦ It is known as a relational database 
management engine.  
◦ The entire database is stored in a single file. 
 So why use SQLite? 
◦ This is the most widely deployed database 
engine according to sqlite.org.
 http://www.sqlite.org/mostdeployed.html
Information provided by Dan O’Day,  hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
 
Slide 11 
File Types - SQLite
 So why use SQLite? 
◦ It is cross-platform compatible.
 Firefox, Chrome,  Safari, Android, Apple, and Linux are 
just a few examples of who uses SQLite. 
◦ No server required, self-contained file and has no 
dependencies.
◦ No configuration or setup needed. 
◦ Public Domain
◦ Supported by most programming languages.
◦ Small code footprints, efficient use of memory, 
disk space, bandwidth
 Good for Mobile Devices!
Information provided by Dan O’Day, hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
 
Slide 12 
File Types - SQLite
 We will talk more about the SQLite 
Database File Format next week.  This will 
include:
◦ Pages
◦ Leaf Pages
◦ FreelistTrunk
◦ B-Trees
 
Slide 13 
SQL
 Relational Database
◦ A relational database contains tables. In those 
tables, records are contained.  Each record 
has a unique identifier called a Primary Key 
(PK). 
◦ A Foreign Key (FK) is when records can have 
a relationship with other tables records by 
using their PK. 
◦ Information provided by Dan O’Day, httcia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
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Slide 14 
SQL
• Data Types
• There are different types of data that 
can be stored.  
• NULL
• Integer (signed integer, 1-8 bytes)
• Real (floating point value, 8-byte IEEE)
• Text (text string, encoded UTF-8 or 16)
• BLOB (binary large object)
Information provided by Dan O’Day, hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
 
Slide 15 
SQL
 Single Table
◦ Example: 
◦ Example with Data: 
Information 
provided by 
Dan O’Day, 
Hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
Student_ID :: 001 (PK)
Student_Last_Name :: Smith
Student_First_Name :: John
Student_Major Department :: Computer Science
Student
Student_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Student_Last_Name :: VARCHAR(200)
Student_First_Name :: VARCHAR(150)
Student_Major_Department :: VARCHAR(255)
Student
 
Slide 16 
SQL
 One-To-Many Relationship
◦ Example:
Student_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Student_Last_Name :: VARCHAR(200)
Student_First_Name :: VARCHAR(150)
Student_Major_Department_ID:: INTEGER (FK)
STUDENT
Major_Department_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Department_Name :: VARCHAR (255)
DEPARTMENT
Information 
Provided by Dan 
O’Day, hcctia-
sqlite-forensics.pdf  
Slide 17 
SQL
 One-To-Many Relationship
◦ Example with Data
Information 
Provided by
Dan O’Day, hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
Student_ID :: 001(PK)
Student_Last_Name :: Smith 
Student_First_Name :: John
Student_Major_Department_ID :: 500
STUDENT
Major_Department_ID :: 500
Department_Name ::  Computer Science
DEPARTMENT
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Slide 18 
SQL
 Parsing Date/Time
◦ To parse the date/time of an iOS in SQL, you 
would do the following query:
 SELECT DATETIME (column_name, ‘unixepoch’, 
[‘localtime’])
 iOS (Epoch: 1/1/2001) : Add 978307200 seconds to 
timestamp
Information provided by Dan O’day, hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
 
Slide 19 
SQL
 How to write Basic SQL Queries
◦ A good reference would be the sample 
database found on Chinook. 
 HTTP://CHINOOKDATABASE.CODEPLEX.
COM
 
Slide 20 
SQL Queries
These queries are for a SINGLE table. These same 
methods can be used for a one-to-many relationship later 
on. 
SELECT * FROM STUDENT;
Student_ID Student_Last Name Student_First_Name Student_Major_Department
001 Smith John Computer Science
002 Jones Betsy Information 
Technology
003 Johnson Alex English
004 Martinez Joe Computer Science
 
Slide 21 
SQL Queries
SELECT Student_Last_Name, 
Student_Major_Department_Name from 
STUDENT;
Student_Last_Name Student_Major_Department_Name
Smith Computer Science
Jones Information Technology
Johnson English
Martinez Computer Science
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Slide 22 
SQL Queries
SELECT DISTINCT 
Student_Major_Department_Name FROM 
STUDENT BY 
Student_Major_Department_Name
Student_Major_Department_Name
Computer Science
Computer Science
English
Information Techonology
 
Slide 23 
SQL Queries
SELECT
Student_ID,
Student_Last_Name,
Student_Major_Department_Name
FROM STUDENT
WHERE Student_ID > 002
ORDER BY Student_Last_Name;
Student_ID Student_Last_Name Student_Major_Department_Name
003 Johnson English
004 Martinez Computer Science
 
Slide 24 
SQL Queries
SELECT
Student_ID,
Student_Last_Name, 
Student_Major_Department_Name
FROM STUDENT
WHERE Student_Major_Department_Name=‘Information Technology’
AND Student_ID=002
ORDER BY Student_Last_Name DESC;
Student_ID Student_Last_Name Student_Major_Department_Name
002 Jones Information Technology
 
Slide 25 
SQL Queries
SELECT 
Student_ID AS id,
Student_Last_Name AS last, 
Student_Major_Department_Name AS major
FROM STUDENT
WHERE last LIKE ‘Smi%’;
Id Last major
001 Smith Computer Science
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Slide 26 
SQL Queries
WHERE Clause Operators
Operator Description
= Equal (also IS)
<> Not equal (also != and IS NOT)
> Greater than
< Less than
>= Greater than or equal to
<= Less than or equal to
BETWEEN Between an inclusive range
LIKE Search for a pattern
IN Specify multiple possible values for a column
 
Slide 27 
SQL Queries
Wildcard Operators
Other Operator
Operator Description
% Substitute for 0+ characters
_ Substitute for 1 character (underscore)
Operator Description
|| String concatenation operator
 
Slide 28 
SQL Queries
Basic (Aggregate Functions)
http://www.sqlite.org/lang_aggfunc.html#minggunc
Operator Decription
avg(n) Average of all non-NULL values in n column
count(n) Count instances of given non-NULL column
lower(x) Returns x as lowercase ASCII string
upper(x) Returns x as uppercase ASCII string
max(n) Returns maximum value in column n
min(n) Returns minimum value in column n
sum(n) Sums all non-NULL values (prone to errors 
if bad or unexpected input is given)
total(n) Sums all non-NULL values and returns
floating point value
 
Slide 29 
SQL Queries
These next Query examples will be for 
one-to-many relationships.  
SELECT * FROM DEPARTMENT;
Major_Department_ID Department_Name
500 Computer Science
600 Information Technology
700 English
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Slide 30 
SQL Queries
SELECT * FROM STUDENT
Student_ID Student_Last Name Student_First_Name Student_Major_Department:_ID
001 Smith John 500
002 Jones Betsy 600
003 Johnson Alex 700
004 Martinez Joe 500
 
Slide 31 
SQL Queries
SELECT m.Student_Last_NameAS LN, a.Department_Name
FROM STUDENT
JOIN DEPARTMENT a
ON m.Student_Major_Department_ID = a.Major_Department_ID
ORDER BY LN;
LN Department_Name
Jones Information Technology
Johnson English
Martinez Computer Science
Smith Computer Science
 
Slide 32 
SQL Statements
 JOIN Statements
◦ What are these?
 They return all rows from multiple tables where the 
join condition. 
 The default for JOIN is an INNER JOIN.
 SQLite limits the JOIN funcationality, however. 
 This means there is no RIGHT or FULL OUTER JOIN
Information provided by Dan O’Day, httcia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
 
Slide 33 
SQL - JOIN
Table 
A
Table 
B
INNER JOIN
(default JOIN)
Id B_id Name
1 2 iDevices
2 1 This Class
3 NULL
TABLE A
Id name
1 is interesting
2 rock
3 Is boring
TABLE B
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Slide 34 
SQL - JOIN
Table 
A
Table 
B
INNER JOIN
(default JOIN)
SELECT A.name, B.name 
from A JOIN B on A.b_id = 
b.id
Name name
iDevices rock
This class Is interesting
 
Slide 35 
SQL - JOIN
With NULL in the b_id, we can do a Left 
Outer Join. This compares the tables from 
the left, as shown below. 
Table BTable A
LEFT OUTER JOIN
Name Name
iDevices Rock
This Class Is interesting
NULL
SELECT A.name, B.name 
from A left out join B on 
A.b_id = B.id
Information Provided by Dan O’Day, hcctia-
sqlite-forensics.pdf  
Slide 36 
SQL - JOIN
Another example of a Left Outer Join: 
Table A
LEFT OUTER JOIN
Information Provided by Dan O’Day,  hcctia-
sqlite-forensics.pdf
Table B Name Name
NULL
SELECT A.name, B.name from A left 
outer join B on A.b_ID = B.id where 
B.id is NULL
 
 
Week Five: Advanced SQLite Analysis 
 Week five continues with SQLite analysis, giving a bit more detail about 
the pages in SQL.  Page size is discussed, expressing that a SQLite database can 
grow to 140 terabytes. These pages can be used for a single purpose which could 
be the following options: Lock-Byte, Freelist, B-Tree, Payload or Pointer. 
 The Lock-Byte page is not used by SQLite, but its purpose is to lock a file.  
Freelist are not active pages. However, this is an important page to know because 
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this is the page where deleted data may reside within the database.  If a criminal 
has deleted incriminating evidence on an iOS device, the data may not have been 
erased from the device. It could be stored, and eventually found, in this area. 
These pages are organized by trunk pages, which hold numbers for the freelist 
leaf pages. Now a trunk page contains arrays that contain 4-byte integers.  These 
bytes translate where the data can be found.  For instance, the first number 
contains the page number of the next freelist trunk page, were as the second 
number is the number of leaf page pointers it follows. A leaf page contains no 
information that is used in the database because SQLite does not read or write.  
 A B-Tree, also known as Binary Trees, contain key and data storage.  
SQLite recognizes two types of B-Trees: Table and Index.  Table b-trees store 
data in leaves, which has a key that corresponds to a row id.  An index b-tree has 
only keys, where no data is stored.  With that in mind, a B-Tree page can be one 
of two things: An interior page or a leaf page.  An interior page contains keys 
with pointers to page numbers.  However, a leaf page only contains keys. If the 
table b-tree is a leaf page, each key will have associated data.  
 Payload is important for index b-trees.  The payload is the arbitrary length 
section of the table.  When the payload exceeds threshold, only the first few bytes 
are stored on the b-tree.  The balance is stored in a linked list.  This information is 
key to know when looking through plists. 
 This week’s presentation also introduces a Many-To-Many relationship in 
SQL databases, as well as CASE statements. A CASE statement looks through a 
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list of conditions, and returns one of many possible results. SQLite temporary 
files are also introduced, which include WAL files, Shared-Memory files, 
Temporary Databases, and rollback journals.  A rollback journal allows 
restoration of a database.  This can be very useful in the case of a corrupted 
database.  The presentation goes into detail of how a rollback journal is done, 
which includes a series of locks on the journal until the new rollback is created. 
When this is done, the lock is released. Similar to a rollback journal is the Write-
Ahead log.  This is faster for applications with more writing permissions than read 
permissions.  The write-ahead log allows for multiple transactions to occur, where 
the rollback journal does not. 
 Week five’s presentation concludes with Deleted Record Recovery. Not 
many would know that even if data is deleted off of a device, it does not mean 
that the data is gone, due to free pages and the other pages discussed during this 
lecture.  To try and recover this data, examiners would carve for the database.  By 
carve, we mean to reconstruct.  When an examiner states that they will be carving 
for database, they will be attempting to reconstruct the database to gain 
information.  The examiner would then parse the trees for the information.  
Students will be informed that the entire database will not be recovered. What is 
suggested is that they carve for individual SQLite records.  It is also mentioned 
that most approaches are proprietary to tool manufactures in mobile device 
forensics.  
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PowerPoint Presentation for Week Five 
Slide 1 
iOS Device Forensics
Advanced SQLite Analysis
Week 5
Information provided by Dan O’Day, httcia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
 
Slide 2 
SQLite Database File Format
 A Database file consists of one or more 
pages.
 When parsing any multi-byte ineger value 
in SQLite, read it using big endian.
◦ http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html
Information provided by Dan O’Day, httcia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
 
Slide 3 
SQLite – Page Size
 Page size is a power of two.  It is between 
512 [2^9] and 65536 [2^16].
 Pages within a database file are all the same 
size. 
 Page is a 2-byte integer (big endian) at byte 
offset 16. 
 Maximum number of pages = 2147483646
 This means that a SQLite Database can grow 
to approximately 140TB.
 The total number of pages is stored as a 4-
byte integer at byte offset 28. 
http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html Information provided by Dan O’Day, 
hcctia-sqlite-forensics.pdf  
Slide 4 
SQLite – Page Uses
 So what are these pages used for?
◦ Every page has a single purpose.  It can be one 
of the following: 
 Lock-Byte page
 Freelist Page
 B-Tree Page
 Payload Overflow Page
 Pointer Map Page
http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html
Information provided by Dan 
O’Day  
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Slide 5 
SQLite
 Lock-Byte Page
◦ This page is set aside for OS-Specific 
implementation of file locking. 
 This is not used by SQLite. 
 Freelist Page
◦ These pages are not in active use. 
◦ These maintains a list of page numbers where 
DELETED data may reside within the logical 
database file. 
 This can be useful when we cover Deleted Record 
Recovery. 
http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html
Information provided by Dan 
O’Day, htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf  
Slide 6 
SQLite – Freelist Page
 They are organized as linked list of free 
list trunk pages which contain page 
numbers for 0+ free list leaf pages. 
 Number of freelist pages are stored as 4-
byte integer at byte offset 32. 
http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html
Information provided by Dan 
O’Day, htccia-sqlite-
forensics.pdf  
Slide 7 
SQLite – Freelist Page
 Trunk Page
◦ This contains an array of 4-byte integers. 
 The array will store as many integers as will fit within a 
page.
◦ The first integer contains the page number of the 
next free list trunk page. 
 Or 0 if it is the last freelist trunk page. 
◦ The second integer is the number of leaf page 
pointers to follow. 
 Leaf Page
◦ This page contains no information currently used 
in the Database. 
 SQLite doesn’t read or write. 
http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html
Information provided by Dan O’Day, 
htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf  
Slide 8 
SQLite – B-Tree Pages
 Binary Trees
◦ Key/Data Storage is here
 Most keys are variable integers, variants, between 1 
and 9 bytes. 
 SQLite has two types:
◦ 1 – Table b-trees
 Stores data in leaves.  The key corresponds to 
rowid
◦ 2 – Index b-trees
 No data is stored. Only Keys. 
http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html Information provided by Dan O’Day, 
htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf  
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Slide 9 
SQLite – B-Tree Pages
 The B-Tree page is either:
◦ An interior page
 The keys with pointers to child b-tree pages.  i.e., 
page #
 Key + pointer on left = “cell”
◦ Leaf Page
 It contains keys
 If table b-tree each key will have associated data. 
http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html Information provided by Dan O’Day, 
htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf  
Slide 10 
SQLite – Payload 
 The “payload” of a cell = arbitrary length section
◦ For index b-trees this is key! 
◦ For table b-tree leaf pages this is the content, and 
interior table b-trees have no payload. 
 When payload exceeds theshold, only the first 
few bytes are stored on the b-tree page. 
 Balance is stored in a linked list of content 
overflow pages. 
 First four bytes of payload overflow page stores 
page number of next page in chain. 
 Overflow:
◦ http://forensicsfromthesausagefactory.blogspot.com/2
011/07/sqlite-overflow-pages-and-other-loose.html
http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html Information provided by Dan O’Day, 
htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf  
Slide 11 
SQLite – Pointer Map
 Extra pages inserted into the database to 
make VACUUM more efficient.
◦ VACUUM will be discussed more later. 
 All other page types in database have 
pointers from parent to child. 
◦ Pointer Map (ptrmap) is the exact opposite. 
◦ Pointers are from child to parent. 
 Page 2 is a Ptrmap when AUTO_VACUUM 
is enabled.
◦ http://forensicsfromthesausagefactory.blogspot.co
m/2011/05/sqlite-pointer-maps-pages.html
http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat.html Information provided by Dan O’Day, 
htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf  
Slide 12 
SQL
 Many-To-Many Relationship 
◦ Example
Information 
Provided by
Dan O’Day, htccia-sqlite-forensics.pdf
Student_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Student_Last_Name :: VARCHAR(200)
Student_First_Name :: VARCHAR(150)
Student
Major_Department_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Department_Name :: VARCHAR (255)
Department
Student_Department_ID :: INTEGER (PK)
Student_Major_Student_ID :: INTEGER (FK)
Student_Depart_Department_ID :: INTEGER (FK)
Student_Department
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Slide 13 
SQL
 The Tables we will use for examples for Many-To-Many 
Relationships:
Student
Department
Student_Department
Student_ID Student_Last_Name Student_First_Name
001 Smith John
Major_Department_ID Department_Name
500 Computer Science
Student_Department_ID Student_Department_Student_ID Student_Depart_Deparment_ID
1 001 500
 
Slide 14 
SQL – CASE Statements
 CASE Statements
◦ Using the Chinook database, we know the 
type values:
 1 is sent
 2 is received
 3 is an error
◦ We also know the flag
values:
 R is read
 U is unread
Information Provided by
Dan O’Day and Chinook  
Slide 15 
SQL – CASE Statements
 This is an example using what we learned 
last week to work with CASE statements.
Information Provided by Dan 
O’Day and Chinook  
Slide 16 
SQLite - Rollback Journal
 What is a rollback journal?
◦ This allows restoration of a database to its 
original state. 
◦ When writing to a database with a rollback 
journal, it creates the rollback journal file with 
original data being altered. 
◦ It is stored in the same folder as the database 
with ‘-journal’ filename suffix. 
◦ This is the default behavior of SQLite.
http://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html
Information provided by Dan 
O’Day  
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SQLite – Rollback Journal
 How Rollback Journal works…
◦ “shared lock” placed on database file
 This allows multiple reads but prevents writing while 
reading. 
 Only a subset of pages in the database file  
are read.
◦ But always writes a complete “sector” of data.
◦ Freelist pages are not journaled!
 “reserved” lock placed on the database file 
prevents any writes from other processes.
◦ This signals intent to write.
Information provided by Dan 
O’Dayhttp://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html  
Slide 18 
SQLite - Rollback Journal
 The rollback journal file is created.
◦ Most OS’s do not write this file to disk initially. It is stored 
in the cache only.
 The header contains original database file size.
 Pages are modified in user space (RAM)
 It will flush contents of journal file to non-volatile 
storage
◦ Forces write to disk
◦ This is a crucial step so database can survive unexpected 
power loss.
 “Exclusive Lock” obtained
◦ “pending lock” is issued first which allows any existing 
‘shared locks’ to finish but allows no new locks
 Preventing ‘writer starvation’
Information provided by Dan 
O’Dayhttp://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html  
Slide 19 
SQLite – Rollback Journal
 Changes are written to the database file 
and then flushed to the disk. 
 The rollback journal is then deleted
◦ Transaction now considered “committed”
 The lock is then released. 
Information provided by Dan 
O’Dayhttp://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html  
Slide 20 
SQLite - Rollback Journal
 Something to know is that deleting files is 
‘expensive’ on many file systems. 
 SQLite can be configured so that either:
◦ 1 – the journal header is zeroed out
 This means that the next time a journal is needed, 
the existing one is simply overwritten rather than 
creating a ‘new’ file. 
◦ 2 – The journal file is truncated to 0 byte file 
size.
Information provided by Dan 
O’Dayhttp://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html  
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Slide 21 
SQLite – “Hot Rollback Journal”
 This is when something goes wrong and the 
data is only partially written and/or not 
written when it should have been. 
 The database is inconsistent and must be 
repaired. 
 The incomplete changed are rolled back
◦ Exclusive lock obtained
◦ Content from rollback journal written to 
Database
◦ Truncate database file back to its original size
◦ Delete ‘hot’ journal
Information provided by Dan 
O’Dayhttp://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html  
Slide 22 
SQLite – Write-Ahead Log 
 Write-Ahead logs (WAL) allows concurrent 
reads and writes. 
 Faster for applications with more writes 
than reads, but only for smaller transactions.
 More efficient use of I/O operations
 Page size cannot be changed
 Requires shared memory by all processes 
using database
◦ -shm files with no persistent content
 i.e., cant’ be used over network.
 Often can’t be read on read-only media.
Information provided by Dan 
O’Dayhttp://www.sqlite.org/wal.html  
Slide 23 
SQLite – Write-Ahead Log
 It’s an inversion of the rollback journal 
process.
◦ Oringal content is preserved in database file.
◦ Changes appended to the WAL file
◦ Transaction considered ‘committed’ when 
special record appended to WAL
 Even if change actually has not yet been written to 
database file
◦ Allows multiple transaction to occur 
‘simultaneously.’
Information provided by Dan 
O’Dayhttp://www.sqlite.org/wal.html  
Slide 24 
SQLite – Write-Ahead Log
 Checkpointing
◦ This transfers all transactions appended to WAL to the 
original database file.
◦ Automatically occurs when WAL reaches threshold of 
1000 pages by default.
◦ When WAL is committed to disk, new appended 
transactions begin overwriting the WAL file.
 Wal-index in shared memory tracks reads to ensure 
proper data is returned at time requested, factoring 
in ‘commits.’
◦ Read request checks wal-index to see if page requested is 
in WAL.
 If not, the page from the original database file is returned.
 If so, most recent version of the page is returned from the WAL 
file.
Information provided by Dan 
O’Dayhttp://www.sqlite.org/wal.html  
39 
 
Slide 25 SQLite – Temporary Files Created 
by SQLite
 These are the types of temp files created by SQLite:
◦ Rollback Journals (-journal)
◦ WAL files (-wal)
◦ Shared-memory files (-shm)
◦ Statement Journals
 Given random name, location may not be in same directory as 
database, used to rollback single statement for larger transactions, 
look for etilqs)
◦ TEMP databases 
 Get its own database file and respective rollback journal
◦ Master Journals
 Only when single transaction makes changes to multiple 
databases that are using the same connection
◦ Transient indices/databases
 Usually associated with VACUUM
Information provided by Dan 
O’Dayhttp://www.sqlite.org/tempfiles.html  
Slide 26 
SQLite Deleted Record Recovery
 When information is deleted, the pages where it was stored 
are added to a list of free pages, as stated in the previous 
page.  That way, they can be reused the next time data is 
inserted.  
 However, when an entire page is NOT deleted, something 
called “freeblocks” are created. 
 Freeblocks are unallocated space in a page either below or between 
allocated records.  They have 4-byte headers pointing to the next 
freeblock. 
 The deleted records reside in both freeblocks and unallocated space 
in the logical database file.
 A good thing to know is that if the database has 
AUTO_VACUUM = TRUE, then all free pages are moved to 
the end of the database file and the database is condensed 
after every commit. 
 
Slide 27 
SQLite Deleted Record Recovery
 In iOS…
◦ You can get a good recovery of allocated 
database content.
◦ Prior to 4S, you can get a good recovery of 
latent/unallocated SQLite files.
 
Slide 28 
SQLite Deleted Record Recovery
 VACUUM
◦ When a large amount of data is deleted from the 
database, it leaves behind “free” pages.
 This makes the database larger than it really needs to 
be.
◦ Frequent writes can cause the database to 
become fragmented.
◦ Contents of the enter database are copied into a 
temp database. Then the original is overwritten.
◦ When overwriting an original, a rollback journal, 
or WAL, is used as normal. 
http://www.sqlite.org/lang_vacuum.html Information provided by Dan 
O’Day  
40 
 
Slide 29 SQLite Deleted Record Recovery -
Approaches
 Carve for databases
◦ Easy-to-find header, but no footer
◦ File length not stored within file
 Meaning you must check each page in ‘chain’
◦ Must parse b-trees and other SQLite specific 
structures
 B-trees were discussed earlier.  
 
Slide 30 SQLite Deleted Record Recovery –
Approaches
 Don’t recover entire database’s.  Carve for 
individual SQLite records in unallocated space /file 
slack of latent files. 
◦ OK for text messages and other single-table data, 
but not for relational data where multiple tables 
are needed. 
◦ No schema or Data Structure. 
 Vacuum one copy of the database and 
compare the differences between that and 
an un-vacuumed copy.
 Most approaches are proprietary to tool 
manufacturers in mobile device forensics.
 
Slide 31 SQLite Deleted Record Recovery –
Approaches
 You could also use Python
◦ Speeds up the process 
◦ Focus on finding unallocated/free table b-leaf 
pages.
 This is not a python class, however someone did 
this all for us.  
 http://az4n6.blogspot.com.es/2013/11/python-parser-to-recover-
deleted-sqlite.html, Mari DeGrazia
 
 
Chapter 7 – Week Six: Analysis Strategies and Commercial Tools 
 Week six begins with file carving.  File carving was discussed briefly in 
the previous week. To refresh, file carving is a process that specifies file types, 
which are searched and extracted. 14 File carving examines the binary data, and 
then identifies the file based on their file header.  It is also good to know that if 
14 (Hoog & Strzempka, Acquistions: File Carving, 2011) 
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the file format has a known header; it will be scanned from header until it does 
find the footer.  Only when these steps are done, the data is saved to a disk for 
examination.  
 During file carving, one should remember that files do not always stay 
pristine. Files are sometimes fragmented, similar to a computer having 
fragmented files.  It is important to know about fragment files because when the 
file carving techniques require that the data is sequential in the image.  What this 
just means is that the carving will not produce a full file it is fragmented.  
 Fragmenting can happen in many ways.  One way for fragmenting can 
occur is the memory type, as well as the process of saving a file to nonvolatile 
storage.  This can also mean that larger files, such as videos, are harder to recover.  
The process of file carving normally includes a configuration file for the tool, the 
data carving tool itself and the disk image that has the desired data.  The tool will 
find the data, and the results will be grouped by the file type upon completion.  
 Students will learn about string extractions.  Strings are extracted using 
ASCII15 printable strings.  This type of extraction is normally used on a Linux 
workstation.  In this setting, these strings are normally at least four characters 
long. This type of analysis is effective for quick examination for information that 
can be of interest.  However, this technique is not refined. 16 
15 American Standard Code for Information Interchange. This is a code that represents a single 
unique character.  
16 (Hoog & Strzempka, Acquisitions: Strings, 2011) 
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 When doing this type of analysis, there are a few options to keep in mind, 
which are given to the students. For instance, “—all” options tell strings to 
examine the entire file and “—radix” options tell strings to print the offset within 
the file where the string is found.17 The “—radix” can also be helpful when 
combining strings to find evidence.   
 String extraction can be very useful and powerful.  With a combination of 
searching and filters, examiners can determine important data such as phone 
numbers, name, locations, GPS coordinates and dates.  One must remember that 
other tools can be used to find more data.  
 Students will learn this week about metadata as well.  Metadata is data that 
gives more information on a data.  A device can hold exchangeable image file 
(EXIF) data, EXIF geolocation and embedded timestamps, which are types of 
metadata.  The EXIF data is normally associated with digital pictures and videos, 
and can give information about Date, Time and Location of the media. For 
example, a digital picture’s EXIF data would tell what date the picture was taken, 
what time the picture was taken and where the picture was taken. EXIF 
Geolocation, also known as a geotag, stores the longitude and latitude of where 
the picture or video was taken. This can be crucial in an investigation, especially 
if a photograph or video of the crime scene is discovered on the device. The 
embedded timestamp gives an accurate time as to when the media was taken, 
helping investigators determine a timeline. It is important to note that timestamps 
work on absolute time. This just means that it is in the number of seconds since 
17 (Hoog & Strzempka, Acquisitions: Strings, 2011) 
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January 1st, 2001.  Thankfully, tools are available to calculate the time for 
examiners so they do not have to do the calculations by time.  
 The presentation concludes with tools that examiners might use in the 
field. These tools include Cellebrite UFED, Katana Forensics Lantern, Elcom iOS 
Forensic Toolkit and AccessData Mobile Phone Examiner Plus. Each tool is given 
a brief explanation.  Most of these tools require a license purchase in order for it 
to be used.  
PowerPoint Presentation for Week Six 
Slide 1 
iOS Device Forensics
Analysis Strategies and Commercial Tools
Week 6
 
Slide 2 
File Carving
 What is file carving?
◦ File Carving is a process that specified file types 
are searched and extracted. 
 This can be across binary data.  Most often it is forensic 
image of a disk or partition. 
 So how does it work?
◦ By examining the binary data and identifying files 
based on their known file header. 
◦ If the file format has a known footer, it will scan 
from the header until it find the footer.
 Or hits a maximum file length set by the configuration 
file. 
◦ It is then saved to disk for further examination. 
iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p138  
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File Carving
 Files are sometimes fragmented, much like how a 
computers files are fragmented. 
 Traditional File carving techniques required that 
the data is sequential in the image. This means it 
will not pick up produce a full file if it is 
fragmented. 
 File can become fragmented in many ways. 
◦ The process for saving the file to nonvolatile storage 
varies by file system type. 
◦ The strong influence of memory type also plays a part 
in why a file is fragmented. 
 This also means that larger files, like videos, will 
be harder to recover. 
iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p138  
Slide 4 
File Carving
 The Data Carving process normally includes 
a few things:
◦ The configuration file for the tool
 Contains details related to the file types that are going 
to be carved out of the image.
◦ The data carving tool
 Search the raw data for signatures of the file types 
referenced in the configuration file. 
◦ A disk image that has the desired data. 
 The results of the tool will be grouped by 
file type once the data carving is completed. 
iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p139  
Slide 5 
Strings Extraction
 On a linux workstation, the string 
command will extract ASCII printable 
strings. 
◦ They will be at least four characters long.
◦ They will be from any file, text or binary. 
 String Extraction is quite effective at 
quickly examining binary data for 
information that can be of interest. 
◦ However, this is not a sophisticated technique. 
iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p144  
Slide 6 
String Extraction
 Here are a few options you need to keep in 
mind when executing strings:
◦ “--all” options tells strings to examine the entire 
file.
 Note: On certain files, this will only examine certain 
portions of the file.
◦ “--radix” options tells strings to print the offset 
within the file where the string was found.
◦ Character encoding of the strings that provide 
support for the Unicode characters in both Big 
and little endian formats.
iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p145  
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Slide 7 
String Extraction
 Back to “--radix” option…
◦ This is very helpful! When and why?
 This is helpful when you combine strings and a hex 
editor to find evidence. 
 This option can print the offset in octal (--radix=o), 
hex (--radix=x) or decimal (--radix=d). 
 If using a hex editor, best option would be hex or 
decimal. 
iPhone and iDevice Forensics, Hoog, p145  
Slide 8 
String Extraction
 Strings can be a very powerful command 
that examiners can use when combining 
searching and filters. 
 With this combination, examiners can 
determine phone numbers, names, 
locations, GPS coordinates, dates and 
other information found on a data file. 
 However, there are other tools that can 
be used to find more data. This is just one 
options. 
 
Slide 9 
Metadata
 What is metadata?
◦ Data that provides information about one or 
more aspect of the data.
 For example, Digital Photographs have metadata 
though it’s EXIF (Exchangable Image File). 
 So what metadata can idevices have?
◦ EXIF geolocation
◦ Embedded timestamps
◦ Can be included in pictures through EXIF. 
http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-analysis-ios-devices-34092  
Slide 10 
Metadata - EXIF
 Exchangeable Image File (EXIF) Format is 
used to store digital pictures.  
◦ This can also include videos!!!!
 EXIF data can be used to find metadata 
about the media used.  This includes:
◦ Date
 When the picture on the idevice was taken.
◦ Time
 What time the picture was taken. 
◦ Location
 Location, called EXIF Geolocation, will be covered in 
more detail in the next slide. 
http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-analysis-ios-devices-34092  
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Slide 11 
Metadata – EXIF Geolocation
 Geolocation, or a Geotag, is the GPS data 
that can be found in an image’s header.  
 What it stores is the longitude and 
latitude of where the picture or video 
was taken. 
◦ This can be very beneficial for when there are 
incriminating pictures found on a phone that 
can help a case. 
http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-analysis-ios-devices-34092  
Slide 12 
Metadata – EXIF Geolocation
 Surprisingly, there are apps on iTunes that can show you EXIF data 
for photographs. 
 Some require you to pay for the service, while others are free. 
 However, they may not be able to retrieve all the information that  
a forensics tool can. 
http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-analysis-ios-devices-34092  
Slide 13 
Metadata – Embedded Timestamp
 Everything in iOS has a Timestamp to when the 
volume was created.  
 It should be noted that when working with 
timestamps, it will be provided in CF Absolute 
Time.  
◦ This means that the number of seconds since January 
1st, 2001. 
 The formula to find the time of the timestamp is 
the following:
◦ =CreatedTime/(60*60*24)+DATE(2001,1,1)
 Thankfully there are tools that can help us 
translate the time for us. 
◦ http://www.epochconverter.com/
http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-analysis-ios-devices-34092  
Slide 14 
Metadata – Embedded Timestamp
 Here are some examples of places to find 
Embedded Timestamps:
◦ Pictures
◦ Notes
◦ Text Messages
◦ GPS
 A good reference for more information 
about Timestamps and Time Utilities would 
be on the Mac Developer Library: 
◦ https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documen
tation/CoreFoundation/Reference/CFTimeUtils/R
eference/reference.html
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Slide 15 Capabilities and Limitations of 
Current Tools
 The most recent product for Cellebrite
UFED is the UFED Touch Ultimate. 
◦ http://www.cellebrite.com/mobile-
forensics/products/standalone/ufed-touch-
ultimate
◦ It can do a lot of things for examiners such as: 
 Extractions
 Decoding
 Analysis and Reporting
 Physical and logical acquisitions
 File system and password extraction. 
◦ It also comes with cables to use with the UFED, 
as well as handling multiple languages. 
 
Slide 16 Capabilities and Limitations of 
Current Tools 
◦ For iPhones, Cellebrite supports Apple devices 
running IOS3+.
 It does not say anything about IOS 8, but the tool may 
or may not have capabilities for it. 
◦ It can also be used for other devices like 
blackberry and android devices. 
◦ You do have to buy a license in order to use this 
tool. 
◦ Here is a video of an older version of Cellebrite
UFED on an iPhone. This can show what the tool 
is capable of before the most current version: 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NFRAy3PyRx4
 
Slide 17 Capabilities and Limitations of 
Current Tools 
 Katana Forensics Lantern
◦ https://katanaforensics.com/products/
◦ One of the more popular mobile forensics 
applications out today. 
◦ The tool is capable of many things that are 
beneficial for examiners. This can include: 
 Multiple Device Acquisitions within one case file.
 Logical and Physical Extractions on IOS devices
 Passcode Recovery of IOS. 
 And many more on the Katana website. 
 
Slide 18 Capabilities and Limitations of 
Current Tools 
◦ However, this tool is not free.  There is a 
License that you have to buy in order to use 
the product.  
◦ A drawback of this tool is that it is also only 
able to be used on Mac OS and Linux 
machines.
◦ Here are a few videos on Katana Forensics:
 Acquiring an iPhone
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJ80yo1KM-
Y&list=UUE8I-7OP_i1qJLhbqEP0NqQ
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Slide 19 Capabilities and Limitations of 
Current Tools
 Elcom iOS Forensic Toolkit
◦ http://www.elcomsoft.com/eift.html
◦ This tool is available for both Mac OS and 
Windows OS. 
◦ This tool is capable of a lot of useful things, 
which include: 
 Acquire device images.
 Supports all versions of iOS from 3 to 7
 8 is not available yet. 
 Physical and Logical acquisition available 
 
Slide 20 Capabilities and Limitations of 
Current Tools
◦ This tool highlights that it is able to gain more 
information then is what is in the backups, 
including passwords, usernames, email messages, 
SMS and mail files. 
◦ You do have to buy the toolkit in order to use it. 
◦ This video is more of an advertisement then an 
actual demonstration, but it does highlight a lot of 
what the toolkit is capable of: 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8_zZGCnmWkE&lis
t=PLNaP4c_hyMYyD1mH0v7vGCNCU4I7Rg5kL
◦ This video shows a bit more in how to use the 
tool:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05ly9hC61Ms&list=P
LNaP4c_hyMYyD1mH0v7vGCNCU4I7Rg5kL&index=2
 
Slide 21 Capabilities and Limitations of 
Current Tools
 AccessData Mobile Phone Examiner Plus 
(MPE+)
◦ http://accessdata.com/solutions/digital-
forensics/mpe?/solutions/digital-
forensics/mobile-phone-examiner
◦ Supports over 7000 cell phones and mobile 
devices, includign IOS, Android, Windows 
Mobile and Blackberry
◦ The tool promotes that it is easy to use and 
needs virtually zero training. 
 
Slide 22 Capabilities and Limitations of 
Current Tools
◦ There are many attachments to it, such as MPE+ 
Velocitor and MPE+ nFIELD.
 nField performs Logical and Physical Acquisitions in a 
guided manner.  It can also be used on any device 
running Windows 7 or higher. 
 Velocitor can perform physical and logical extraction 
from Chinese mobile devices. 
◦ It also has a plist viewer and visualization tools. 
◦ Can be downloaded from the site!
◦ Another video showing a demonstration:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=luTtK7WWTyc
 Go to time 4:00 to show how MPE+ can be seen in ios.  Yes, 
the iphone 3g is old, but it is still a good example. 
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Chapter 8 – Week Seven: Introduction to iOS Security 
 Week seven gives students an introduction to iOS security.  Students are 
then introduced to wiping the device through different methods. The first 
discussed is iCloud Remote Wiping.  This option allows the device to be erased 
through iCloud. The application “Find my iPhone” is an example of this.  If the 
device is lost, missing or stolen, the device can be erased remotely.  It is 
confirmed by using the users Apple ID and password.  
 The next method is just a secure erase.  This wipes the clean, which can be 
done through the “erase all content and settings” option in the device.  This option 
was not always available to the devices. Up until iOS 2.0, the devices would not 
be securely erased. With the release of iOS 3.0, apple introduced hardware-level 
encryption which allowed a faster and secure wipe process.18 With the standard 
hardware encryption generates an encryption key.  When the device is erased, the 
encryption key is wiped and lost.  With no encryption key, the data cannot be 
interpreted.  
 Keychains are also mentioned once more in this presentation.  The 
keychain works as a secure storage container, which holds passwords and 
multiple applications. In iOS, each application has access to its own keychain 
items, which means that applications cannot access other applications items. 
Keychain backups are also discussed, which happens whenever the device’s data 
is backed up.  The keychain remains encrypted with the keys throughout the 
18 (Hollington, 2013) 
 
50 
 
                                                          
backup, however.  Examples are then given to the students to help explain this 
point.  
 NSProtectionNone is a hardware deduced key by the application or OS 
data.  If a file is created without specifying any accessibility constant, it is marked 
as NSProtectionNone.  Before iOS 5, apple could return the NSProtectionNone 
data from locked devices. Up until iOS 8, apple could get information off a locked 
device.  Due to apple’s new privacy policy, apple cannot gain access to an iOS 8 
device.  
 This point is important to know when dealing with search warrants for 
devices. Even with a warrant from law enforcement, Apple cannot gain access to 
an iOS 8 device without the user’s passcode. Normally with the proper 
paperwork, law enforcement agencies can get the data off a device to help with a 
case. This is still true with iOS 7 and below.  According to Zdziarksi, some user 
generated active files that can be provided are Photos, Video, Contact and Call 
History.  
 This presentation also goes back to discussing encryption, which was 
discussed in week two’s lecture.  Data protection is discussed, including how it is 
constructed and managed by a hierarchy of keys.  They build on the encryption 
technologies that already exist on the iOS device.  
 For data protection, there are classes that can be assigned when a new file 
is created.  These basic classes are complete protection, protected unless open, 
protected until first user authentication and no protection.  Complete protection 
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can be compared to unlocking an iDevice using a passcode or fingerprint. 
Protected unless open allows encryption that runs in the background, such as 
when an attachment is being downloaded.  Protected until first user authentication 
acts like complete protection, but does not remove the decrypt key when the 
device is locked.  No protection means that the device is only protected with the 
unique user id (UID). 19   
 To conclude this presentation, iOS Backup is discussed.  Backups can 
occur through iTunes or through the iCloud. The iPhone Analyzer is useful for 
working with backups that need to be decrypted without a passcode.   
PowerPoint Presentation for Week Seven 
Slide 1 
iOS Device Forensics
Introduction to iOS Security
Week 7
 
Slide 2 iOS Security – iCloud Remote 
Wiping
 What is iCloud Remote Wiping?
◦ It is an option to erase your iDevice through 
iCloud. It is normally associated with the “Find 
My iPhone.”
 This app can also find and lock lost devices. 
◦ This is done by using your Apple ID password to 
confirm. 
◦ Once the phone is found, you can have an option 
to restore the phone through a backup. 
 http://www.cultofmac.com/266448/remotely-wipe-
iphone-data-stolen-ios-tips/
 http://support.apple.com/kb/PH2701
 
19 (Apple, 2014) 
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Slide 3 
iOS Security – Secure Erase
 A secure erase of an iDevice wipes the 
device clean.  
◦ A good example of a Secure Erase is the 
“Erase All Content and Settings” option built 
into iDevices. 
 Earlier iDevices (especially the original 
iPhone) did not securely erase data.  
◦ This was changed in iOS 2.0. 
http://www.ilounge.com/index.php/articles/comments/securely-erasing-an-iphone/
 
Slide 4 
iOS Security – Secure Erase
 When iOS 2.0 came out,  erasing data 
securely was done by doing a bit-by-bit 
wipe of the flash memory. 
◦ This took 1 – 3 hours depending on the 
device. 
 When iOS 3.0 came out, apple had 
introduced hardware-Level encryption. 
Why?
◦ This allowed a fast, secure wipe process.
http://www.ilounge.com/index.php/articles/comments/securely-erasing-an-iphone/
 
Slide 5 
iOS Security – Secure Erase
 The standard hardware encryption does not 
specifically protect your data during normal use. 
 What it does is generate a device-specific 
encryption key. 
 Seeing how everything stored in the device’s flash 
memory is encrypted with this key, the “Erase All 
Content and Settings” option simply needs to 
securely wipe the encryption key. 
◦ This allows everything else in the device’s memory to 
be a bunch of encrypted data that can not be read. 
There is no more key!
http://www.ilounge.com/index.php/articles/comments/securely-erasing-an-iphone/
 
Slide 6 
iOS Security - Keychain
 What is a keychain?
◦ A keychain is an encrypted container. It holds 
passwords and multiple applications .
◦ It is also a secure storage container. 
 This means that when the keychain is locked, no 
one can access it’s protected contents. 
 In iOS, each application has access to it’s 
own keychain items. 
◦ This also means that the application does not 
have access to any other application’s items.
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02con
cepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW9  
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Slide 7 
iOS Security - Keychain
 iPhone Keychain Backups
◦ When a user backs up iPhone data, the 
keychain data is backed up. 
◦ However the secrets in the keychain remain 
encrypted.  This means that the keychain 
password is not included in the backup. 
◦ This means that passwords and other secrets 
stored in the keychain cannot be used by 
someone who gains access to the backup. 
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02con
cepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW9
 
Slide 8 
iOS Security - Keychain
 It is good to know that Keychain Services uses a key-
value dictionary to specify the attributes of the 
keychain item that you want to search for. 
 According to Keychain Services Programming Guide, 
typical search dictionary consists of:
◦ The class key value pair. This specifies the class of items to 
search.  i.e., internet passwords or cryptographic keys
◦ One of more key-value pairs that specify the attribute data 
to be matched. This can be a label or creation date. 
◦ One or more search Key-value pairs.  These specify values 
that further hone the search. This can be issuing 
certificates or email address to match.
◦ A return-type key-value pair.  This specifies the type of 
results you want. 
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02con
cepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW9
 
Slide 9 
iOS Security - Keychain
 Keychain Services Programming Guide found 
on the iOS Developer Library gives a good 
example of using the dictionary:
 The following example is taken from the 
developer library. The link is provided near 
the bottom of this slide. 
◦ Lets say we wanted to perform a case-insensitive 
search for a password.  The account name that 
has the password we want is “ImaUser”.
 You can use the following dictionary shown on the next 
slide with the SecItemCopyMatching Function.
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02con
cepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW9  
Slide 10 
iOS Security - Keychain
 This chart was taken from Keychain Services Programming Guide 
found on the iOS Developer Library
◦ https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServCo
ncepts/02concepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW1 
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Slide 11 
iOS Security - Keychain
 The kSecReturnData key causes the function 
to return the keychains item’s data.  
◦ This would be the password we were searching 
for. 
 If we wanted a dictionary of attribute keys 
and values, we can use the 
kSecReturnAttributes return-type key with a 
value of kCFBooleanTrue. 
◦ This option can help determine the creation date 
of the item. 
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02con
cepts/concepts.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP30000897-CH204-SW9  
Slide 12 iOS Security – NSProtectionNone
data
 What is NSProtectionNone?
◦ All native application/OS data is encrypted with a key 
not married to the passcode. However, it is encrypted 
with a hardware deduced key (NSProtectionNone). 
 If a file is created without specifying any 
accessibility constant, then the file is marked as 
NSProtectionNone. 
◦ It is accessible even when the device is locked. 
 http://www.securitylearn.net/2012/10/18/extracting-data-
protection-class-from-files-on-ios/
 Before iOS 5, if Apple was provided with the 
device, they could return the NSProtectionNone
data from passcode locked devices. 
https://pentest.com/ios_backdoors_attack_points_surveillance_mechanisms.pdf  
Slide 13 
iOS Security – Search Warrants
 Of course, before an examiner can look into an iDevice, they 
need to have a warrant. 
 The search warrant has to be specific for what you can find.  
 According to Jonathan Zdziarski, Apple can extract certain 
categories of active data from passcode locked iOS 7 or 
older devices when provided a valid search warrant. 
◦ https://pentest.com/ios_backdoors_attack_points_surveillance_
mechanisms.pdf
 As stated in a previous lecture, even a search warrant may 
not be enough for Apple to access a user’s iOS 8 Device.  
Due to an updated privacy policy, Apple can not access the 
device. 
◦ http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/17
/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html
 
Slide 14 
iOS Security – Search Warrant
 However, this is only for user generated active files 
on the devices. And this is also for data that is not 
encrypted using the passcode. 
◦ This data can be extracted and provided to law 
enforcement. 
 The categories of user generated active files that can 
be provided according to Zdziarski are the following:
◦ SMS
◦ Photo
◦ Video
◦ Contact
◦ Audio Recording
◦ Call History
https://pentest.com/ios_backdoors_attack_points_surveillance_mechanisms.pdf
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Slide 15 
iOS Security – Search Warrant
 However, with the new iOS 8, going to apple to get 
information may not be much help. 
 As stated in a previous lecture, even a search warrant may 
not be enough for Apple to access a user’s iOS 8 Device.  
Due to an updated privacy policy, Apple can not access the 
device. 
◦ This is according to both the Washington Post, SC Magazine and 
the apple’s privacy policy. 
◦ http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/17
/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html
◦ http://www.scmagazine.com/apple-cannot-comply-with-search-
warrants-on-ios-8-devices/article/372410/
◦ http://www.apple.com/privacy/privacy-policy/
 In order to get the data requested in the warrant, the 
examiners must obtain the information directly form the 
device owner. 
 
Slide 16 
iOS Security - Encryption
 Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) 
protects against the exploitation of memory 
corruption bugs. 
 Built in Apps use this to ensure that all memory 
regions are randomized upon launch. 
 By randomly arranging the memory address, it 
reduces the change of sophisticated activities. 
 ASLR is part of the enforced security measures 
done in the XNU. 
◦ XNU is the kernel at the heart of iOS and OS X 
systems. It is assumed to be trusted and enforces 
security measures. 
http://images.apple.com/cn/ipad/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf  
Slide 17 
iOS Security - Encryption
 Data protection allows the device to respond to 
events like phone calls.  
◦ However, it can also enable a high level of encryption for 
sensitive data. 
◦ For example, Mail uses data protection by default.  Third-
party apps installed on iOS 7 and iOS 8 automatically get 
this protection. 
 Data protection is constructed and managed by a 
hierarchy of keys. They build on the hardware 
encryption technologies built into the iOS Device. 
 It is controlled on a per-file basis. This is done by 
assigning each file to a class. Accessibility is then 
determined by whether the class keys have been 
unlocked. 
http://images.apple.com/cn/ipad/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf  
Slide 18 
iOS Security – Data Protection
 When a file on the data partition is created, 
Data Protection creates a new key. 
 It is then given to the hardware AES engine.  
The engine uses the key to encrypt the file 
as it is written to the memory. 
 When a file is opened, its metadata is 
decrypted with the file system key. This 
reveals the wrapped per-file key and a notion 
on which class protects it. The per-file key is 
unwrapped with the classkey, then supplied 
to the hardware AES engine, which decyrpts
the file as it is read from flash memory. 
http://images.apple.com/cn/ipad/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf  
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Slide 19 
iOS Security – Data Protection
 It is good to know that the metadata of all 
files in the file system is encrypted with a 
random key.  The random Key is created 
when iOS is first installed on the device or 
the device is wiped by a user. 
 The file system key is stored in Effaceable 
Storage.  This means the key is not used to 
maintain the confidentiality of the data.  It is 
designed to be quickly erased on demand. 
◦ Back to the “erase all content and settings” 
option!
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1302613-ios-security-guide-sept-2014.html  
Slide 20 
iOS Security – Data Protection
 There are basic classes that a new file is assigned 
to.  They can be: 
◦ Complete Protection
 Key is derived from the user passcode and device UID. After 
the device is locked, data is inaccessible until the user enter 
the passcode again, or unlocks the device using Touch ID. 
◦ Protected Unless Open
 This allows encryption that runs in the background. A good 
example would be a mail attachment downloading in the 
background. 
◦ Protected Until First User Authentication
 Behaves like Complete protection.  However, when the device 
is locked, the decrypt key is not removed.  
◦ No Protection
 Protected only with the UID. Kept in Effaceable Storage. 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1302613-ios-security-guide-sept-2014.html  
Slide 21 
iOS Security - Backup
 Apple does give the option to use a encrypt 
backup option by using a passcode.
◦ If the passcode is forgotten, the encryption stays.
 Normally, the backup is done through iTunes and 
can be found on your computer.  On a windows 
computer, it can be normally found here:
◦ \Documents and Settings\ (username) \Application 
Data\ Apple Computer\MobileSync\Backup\
 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4946
 There are plenty of tools and tips on how to 
decrypt an encrypted backup. 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1302613-ios-security-guide-sept-2014.html  
Slide 22 
iOS Security - Backup
 A known tool is the iPhone Backup Extractor is good 
to try and decrypt backups without a passcode.
◦ http://www.iphonebackupextractor.com/blog/2012/aug/15/
decrypting-encrypted-itunes-backups/
 It should be good to note that the free version is limited in it’s 
abilities, compared to the bought version. 
 According to osxdaily.com, there is a way that may 
work in trying to find a passcode for the backup.  
◦ It can be found by searching through the Keychain access 
which is found in /Applications/Utilities/.
◦ From there, you can search for “iphone backup” and you 
may find a result in Keychain.  
◦ With clicking the “show password’ and enter the Mac 
administrator password, you can reveal the lost password. 
 http://osxdaily.com/2013/06/26/recover-lost-encrypted-backup-
password-ios/
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Slide 23 
Acquisition Methodology
 There are a few things to keep in mind 
when getting an Acquisition. 
 If the device is still active, it is best to 
disable the pattern lock, put the device in 
airplane mode, and turn off the wifi.  
◦ This is if there is no faraday box or faraday 
bag available. 
◦ Disabling the Wifi and putting the phone in 
airplane mode will help avoid the possibility of 
a wipe initiation. 
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 111  
Slide 24 
Acquisition Methodology
 If the device is on and running, leave it on and running.   
There could be information, or live evidence, on the device 
that could be gone if you shut off the device. 
 Likewise, if the device is off, leave it off until you reach the lab 
where the examination will be done.  
 Take the model and firmware version from the device.  To do 
this, examiners would boot the device up in recovery mode.  
 If a phone does not have to booted in normal mode, why 
take the risk of overwriting evidence that can be very 
important??
 Think of this the same way a computer would be examined.  
You wouldn’t start up a computer that possibly has evidence 
on it, risking the loss of the evidence. 
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, Page 111  
 
Chapter 9- Week Eight: Jailbreaking 
 This week’s lecture introduces students to Jailbreaking. When a user jailbreaks 
their device, it means that the device allows the user to modify the operating system.  
This allows the user to add unofficial application installers on the device to install and 
use third party applications.  This is one of the reasons a user jailbreaks their device. With 
iPhones, jailbreaking may be used so the phone can work with a different carrier.  
Jailbreaking also lets the user to manipulate the device.  An example of this manipulation 
is changing the user interface, or changing the application icons. This information can be 
found on idownloadblog.com.20 
 Not only does jailbreaking allows users to manipulate the look of the device, but 
it can also allow tweaks, modifications and extensions to be applied.   An example of a 
tweak that can be applied to a jailbroken device is to allow 5 icons on an iPhone instead 
20 (iDownloadBlog, 2014) 
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of the standard 4.  The worst thing that can happen when jailbreaking a device, it can 
become unresponsive.  There is a fix to this, which is to restore the device’s firmware 
back to the stock version. Updating the iOS in a jailbroken device can be a little tricky. If 
the update is done, it will overwrite the jailbreak.  
 A big question students may ask about jailbreaking would be if it was legal or 
legal.  Jailbreaking became legal in the USA in 201221.  However, jailbreaking an 
iDevice may void the warranty it has.  The warranty on an iDevice becomes void the 
minute that the person jailbreaks the device. 22 According to idownloadblog.com, there is 
a small work around for this.  If the device is reset to factory settings in iTunes, the 
device is reset to how the user bought it.  
 Students are then introduced to the three ways that a device, or iPhone, can be 
jailbroken.  These ways are untethered, semitethered and tethered. The most desirable 
jailbreak is to be untethered.  This allows the user to reboot the device with no 
consequences.  Semitethered does not allow a reboot without some problems with the 
applications or tweaks.  To get the device to function properly, a tethered boot must be 
performed.  A tethered is the least desirable of the three.  A reboot must be done with a 
tethered boot with access to a computer. 23 Firmware is discussed briefly, due to the 
firmware slice being replaced with a hacked firmware. The hacked firmware allows third 
party applications to be installed on the device.  To find the firmware, one can go to 
www.iclarified.com.24 
 Being that this is a forensics class for iOS devices, acquisition on these types of 
devices are discussed.  It is stressed to the students these acquisitions need to be very 
21 (iDownloadBlog, 2014) 
22 (Apple, 2014) 
23 (iDownloadBlog, 2011) 
24 (iClarified, 2008) 
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careful.  Andrew Hoog discusses in his book that there are three steps to acquire the 
device: create a wireless network, remotely connect to the device and finally image the 
device. 25 
 The wireless network needs to be static on the forensic workstation, making sure 
that the IP address will not change.  The examiner then will connect to the device over 
secure shell (SSH), which is a known cryptographic network protocol.  The device is 
finally imaged by using a program called netcat. Netcat will create a tunnel that allows 
the connected devices to communicate.  By initiating a dd26 command, the workstations 
desktop will create a file with the image on it.  It is mentioned that this is one method to 
acquire an image, but the risk is still high for loosing data due to the device being 
jailbroken. 
PowerPoint Presentation for Week Eight 
Slide 1 
iOS Device Forensics
Jailbreaking
Week 8
 
Slide 2 
Jailbreaking – What is it?
 Jailbreaking an iOS device allows the user to 
modify the operating system.  This means 
that the device is modified to run unsigned 
code in order to gain access to files that you 
could not normally access. 
 Jailbreaking also allows unofficial application 
installers onto the device.  These installers 
allow the user to download 3rd party 
applications, tweaks and extensions not 
available in the App Store. 
◦ Example of one of these installers is Cydia. 
http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/  
25 (Hoog & Strzempka, Acquisitons: Jailbroken Device, 2011) 
26 is a way to copy and convert files and can be accessed through SSH 
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Slide 3 Jailbreaking – Why Jailbreak a 
device?
 The main reason why many jailbreak a 
phone is to allow third part applications 
to be on the phone.  
 Jailbreaking also allows the user to do 
things to the device that apple doesn’t 
want you to do for different reasons. 
 These things can include:
◦ Changing App Icons
◦ Changing the User Interface
http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/
 
Slide 4 Jailbreaking – Why jailbreak a 
device? 
 Jailbreaking also allows access to tweaks, 
mods and extensions.  
◦ These are not considered applications.
 These options bring subtle improvements to 
the way your iOS device operates. 
◦ Example:  You can do a tweak that allows you to 
have 5 icons on the iPhone instead of the default 
4. 
 Another big reason that many jailbreak an 
iPhone is to allow it to work with a different 
carrier. 
http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/
 
Slide 5 
Jailbreaking – Legal or Illegal?
 Jailbreaking is LEGAL. 
◦ At least in the USA. 
 Legal since 2010
 Good News!!
◦ Even if you don’t live in the US, there is a slim 
chance that Apple would sue because a user 
jailbroke their device.  It hasn’t happened yet!
http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/
 
Slide 6 Jailbreaking – for iPhones: Warranty 
of device
 For phone providers, does Jailbreaking a 
device Void the Warranty?
◦ Yes and No. 
 If a user goes to an Apple store and show 
the jailbroken device to an employee, you 
won’t be able to receive customer 
support.  Why? The warranty became void 
the minute the device was jailbroke. 
http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/  
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Slide 7 Jailbreaking – for iPhones: Warranty 
of device
 Apple does acknowledge that the US made 
Jailbreaking Legal.  However, that doesn’t 
mean that Apple has to allow jailbreaking in 
its customer agreement. 
◦ http://support.apple.com/kb/ht3743
 There is a work around…
◦ If the user restores the device to factory settings 
in iTunes, it will return the device the user 
received it when they first bought it. 
◦ Apple is usually not able to tell that the device 
was jailbroken, and will provide support. 
http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/  
Slide 8 
Jailbreaking – Worst Case Scenario
 In the early days of jailbreaking, it was 
possible to turn your device into a brick.  
Now a days, not as likely. 
 The worst thing that can happen is that it 
can get stuck and become unresponsive. 
◦ To fix this if it happens, use restore the 
device’s firmware back to the stock version. 
http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/  
Slide 9 
Jailbreaking – Updating iOS
 If the user decides to update the iOS on a 
jailbroken device, it will overwrite the 
jailbreak and restore the device to it’s 
factory settings. 
◦ Pain for those who rely on jailbreak apps and 
tweaks. 
http://www.idownloadblog.com/jailbreak/  
Slide 10 
Jailbreaking – Types of Jailbreaking
 Three ways to jailbreak an iPhone
◦ Untethered
 This is the most desirable jailbreak to have. This allows 
the user to jailbreak the device, run Cydia apps and 
tweaks, and reboot your device with no consequences. 
◦ SemiTethered
 You can reboot your device, but has consequences.  
After the reboot, the user may be unable to run any 
Cydia jailbreak apps.  In order get functionality back, 
users have to perform a tethered boot. 
◦ Tethered
 Least desirable.  Cannot reboot your device without 
doing a tethered boot, which means you need access to 
a computer. 
http://www.idownloadblog.com/2011/10/22/untethered-jailbreak-vs-tethered-jailbreak-vs-semitethered-
jailbreak/  
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Slide 11 
Jailbreaking – Types of Jailbreak
 The following link gives a video explaining 
the types of jailbreaking that can happen:
◦ http://www.idownloadblog.com/2011/10/22/u
ntethered-jailbreak-vs-tethered-jailbreak-vs-
semitethered-jailbreak/
 
Slide 12 Firmware Identification and 
Acquisition
 Firmware Identification can be found on 
the device’s settings. 
 By going to settings and general, you can 
find basic information in the about section 
that includes the Firmware baseband. 
 With a jailbroken device, the Apple’s 
firmware (slice 1) is replaced with custom 
(hacked) firmware. 
http://www.iclarified.com/entry/?enid=2543
 
Slide 13 Firmware Identification and 
Acquisition
 When doing an acquisition on a jailbroken
device, be careful!  Acquiring the device does 
modify the user partition.  This should be 
done as a last resort.
◦ This is because potential evidence could be 
overwritten. 
 There are steps to physically acquire the 
jailbroken device: 
◦ Create a wireless network
◦ Remotely connect to device
◦ Image device
http://www.iclarified.com/entry/?enid=2543
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 129  
Slide 14 Firmware Identification and 
Acquisition
 Create a wireless network
◦ The forensic workstation that the examiner is 
using need to have a wireless network 
created so the device can be remotely 
connected. 
◦ The IP address must be static
 Static meaning unchanging. 
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 129  
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Slide 15 Firmware Identification and 
Acquisition
 Remotely Connect to Device
◦ The device can be connected over SSH. 
 SSH is short for Secure Shell, which is a 
cryptographic network protocal
 If SSH does not work, it is likely SSH is not installed 
on the source packages suggested by the 
jailbreaking site.  The source packages instructs the 
user how to gain root access. 
◦ There are ways to get the SSH to the device. 
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 130  
Slide 16 Firmware Identification and 
Acquisition
 Image Device
◦ There is a program called netcat that can help 
with the imaging. 
◦ Netcat creates a tunnel that allows two devices 
to communicate and transfer files back and forth 
over a specific port. 
 The workstation at one end and the device on the other. 
◦ After initiation the dd command, a file will be 
created on the desktop of the workstation that 
will increase in size as the acquisition occurs. An 
examiner can then look at this file once the 
acquisition is complete. 
iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 132  
Slide 17 Firmware Identification and 
Acquisition
 The book goes into depth about this 
process starting on page 129. 
 This is just one way to gain an acquisition, 
but the risks of gaining the image of a 
jailbroken device is the same. 
 
 
Chapter 10 – Week Nine: Physical Acquisition 
 Week nine starts off with non-forensically sound methods for physical 
acquisitions. Jailbreaking, which was discussed in the previous week’s presentation, is 
considered a non-forensically sound method.  This is because the examiners can tamper 
with the user data.  
 Secure Shell (SSH), dd and netcat are considered non-forensically sound as well. 
These methods were discussed in the previous week as well.  SSH allows examiners to 
64 
 
access the files stored on the device, making this method non-forensically sound.27  In 
UNIX, dd is a way to copy and convert files and can be accessed through SSH. One has 
to be careful when using dd because if you access the wrong file, the device can be 
damaged. 28 This makes it non-forensically sound as well. Netcat is non-forensically 
sound due to communicating over a port that could be secure or unsecure.  
 There are forensically sound methods for doing an acquisition.  One well known 
method is the Zdziarski method.  Jonathon Zdziarski was a former researcher for 
McAfee, Inc.29.  The Zdziarski method is not so much an application, but a toolkit that 
allows acquisitions to occur. What this method does is allows the examiner to execute a 
bit-by-bit copy of the device’s user partition.  The partition gained, which is read-only, 
stays isolated from the partition containing the users data.  Because the user’s data isn’t 
violated, the method is sound.  
 This method may seem familiar to the jailbreaking method.  There are 
differences between the two.  The Zdziarski method caters more to forensic recovery.  It 
deals with read-only partitions on the device. Jailbreaking, however, focuses more on 
hacking into the device.  Hacking into the device might interfere with the user’s data, 
which is not good.   
 Another forensically sound method that is mentioned is Lantern Lite/Imager.30 31 
This is a free software that uses bootloader from the jailbreak took redsn0w. This 
software will then obtain a physical image of an iPhone 4.  Sadly, this tool is known for 
its work with iPhone 4, and not with any other device.  This is forensically sound because 
27 (Lee, 2011) 
28 (Rubin, MacKenzie, & Kemp, 2010) 
29 (Hoog & Strzempka, Acquisitions: Zdziarski Technique, 2011) 
30 (Whitfield, 2012) 
31 (Cavanaugh, 2012) 
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it takes advantage of DFU mode.  It is mentioned that it can be compared to software that 
is used by police, Katana Lantern.  
PowerPoint Presentation for Week Nine 
Slide 1 
iOS Device Forensics
Physical Acquisition
Week 9
 
Slide 2 Non-Forensically Sound Methods -
Jailbreaking
 As discussed last week, Jailbreaking
phones is a non-forensically sound 
method.  
 This is not a forensically sound method 
because when jailbreaking the device, you 
can tamper with the user data.  
◦ This will be discussed more when we talk 
about the Zdzarski method. 
 
Slide 3 Non-Forensically Sound Methods -
SSH
 SSH can be placed on a device after the 
device has been jailbroken, as talked about 
last week. 
 SSH will allow the device to be networked 
onto the computer, using a secure channel. 
 It allows you access to the phone’s files, 
which makes it non-forensically sound due 
to accessing the files. 
◦ Mess with the wrong file, you can ruin your 
device and make it inoperable. 
http://www.idownloadblog.com/2011/03/14/how-to-ssh-into-your-iphone/  
Slide 4 Non-Forensically Sound Methods -
dd
 dd in Unix is to copy and convert a file. 
 You can access dd through the SSH. 
 This goes back to what was stated a few 
slides back.  If you use dd on a wrong file, 
seeing how the files can be accessed, you 
can damage your device.  
◦ Examiners that use this method need to be 
very careful. 
http://linux.die.net/man/1/dd  
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Slide 5 Non-Forensically Sound Methods –
Netcat
 Netcat creates a tunnel that allows two 
devices to communicate and transfer files 
back and forth over a specific port. 
◦ The workstation at one end and the device on 
the other. 
 After initiation the dd command, a file will 
be created on the desktop of the 
workstation that will increase in size as the 
acquisition occurs. An examiner can then 
look at this file once the acquisition is 
complete. 
http://netcat.sourceforge.net/  
Slide 6 Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
 This method was created by Jonathan 
Zdziarksi, who was a former research 
scientist for McAfee, inc.
 Zdziarski understood that “cell phones 
have a comparatively limited operating 
system, cannot boot into a forensic 
environment, and possess a typically 
nonremoveable memory. “ 
◦ iPhone and iOS Forensics – Andrew Hoog & 
Katie Strzempka
iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 124-127  
Slide 7 Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
 Zdziarksi’s method allows the examiner to 
perform a bit-by-bit copy of the iDevice’s
user partition.  It can then provide an MD5 
sum to prove that the copy is authentic. 
 “This ability does not exist in the standard 
iPhone operating system and requires 
modification of a read-only system partition 
to allow for this technique.” 
◦ iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and 
Katie Strzempka
iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 124-127  
Slide 8 Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
 The partition copied, however, remains 
completely isolated from the partition 
containing user data.  It is meant to stay in 
a factory state.  
 This is good and makes the method 
forensically sound.  Why?
◦ It doesn’t violate user data while performing 
necessary payload installation. 
iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 124-127  
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Slide 9 Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
 It is good to know that this technique 
modifies only the system partition, and 
not the user partition. 
 Know that during the normal operation 
of the device, the system partition stays in 
the factory state.  It is only modified when 
a firmware update occurs. 
iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 124-127  
Slide 10 Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
 There are differences between 
Jailbreaking and the Zdziarksi Method. 
◦ Jailbreaking deals more with hacking into the 
device, which means that it will tamper with 
the user data. 
◦ Zdziarski is more tailored to forensic 
recovery.  This means that is operates only on 
read-only system partitions. 
iPhone and iOS Forensics by Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka, 124-127  
Slide 11 Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
 Instead of restoring the device, a bundle 
installs a recovery payload.  This is put on 
the device’s read-only system partition. 
 This lets the examiner SSH access to the 
device.  This is done by bypassing any pass 
code security the device has. 
Forensically-Sound Methods – Zdziarski Method, 124-127  
Slide 12 Forensically-Sound Methods –
Zdziarski Method
 Remember: the Zdziarski Method is not an 
application that can be used.  It is toolkit that allows 
acquisitions. 
◦ The acquisitions are bit-by-bit copies (dd image)
 You can get the toolkit at iPhoneinsecurity.com.  The 
book will discuss in more depth on how to use the 
toolkit. 
◦ Tried to get to iPhoneinsecurity.com, but the website 
doesn’t seem to exist. 
 The website will also provide documentation to help 
with the examination. 
 For reports, a raw dd image is produced.  It can then 
be imported into forensic tools or be analyzed by a 
command line. 
Forensically-Sound Methods – Zdziarski Method, 124-127  
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Slide 13 Forensically-Sound Methods –
Lantern Lite/Imager
 Lantern Lite Imager is a free software.  
 It uses the bootloader from the jailbreak 
tool redsn0w.  It then obtains a full 
physcial image of an iphone 4.  
 Lantern Lite takes advantage of being able 
to going into DFU, which makes it 
Forensically-Sound. 
 It can be compared to Katana Lantern,  
which is used by Police Officials.  
https://forensic4cast.com/2012/03/lantern-lite-imager/
http://www.appleexaminer.com/iPhoneiPad/LanternLite/LanternLite.html  
Chapter 11 – Week Ten: Advanced iOS Security 
 In week ten, the topic for the presentation is advanced iOS security and advanced 
logical acquisitions. The first thing covered in this area is file_relay, which deals with 
backdoors in iOS.  Zdziarski had done research on this, which can be found in his own 
presentation found on his website32. He found that file_relay helps examiners bypass the 
backup encryption found on iTunes.  Zdziarski believes that this is the biggest area of 
intelligence on the device.  File_Relay can be used to gain access to personal data onteh 
device. This data can be email and Facebook accounts, as well as GPS logs, Photos and 
User Databases. User databases can be very useful because it contains short message 
service (SMS) database, which are also text messages, calendars and the address book.  
 Next in advanced logical acquisitions is Pairing Authentication, which uses 
lockdownd. Lockdownd is just a daemon that provides system information to clients.  To 
understand this, one has to understand pairing.  Pairing happens when you give 
permission for a device to access the other device. For example, whenever a person plugs 
their iDevice into a computer, the user allows the computer to access the device.  This is 
a pairing. According to Zdziarski, Juice Jacking can be used to establish a pairing.  Juice 
Jacking, according to howtogeek.com, Juice Jacking is “leveraging the USB data/power 
32 (Zdziarski, 2014) 
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cable to illegitimately access the phone’s data and/or inject malicious code onto the 
device.”33 By the definition provided, this can be a bad thing.   
 This can also bypass the backup encryption. Another note about Pairing 
Authentication to make is that all of the lockdownd protocols have been documented in 
the libimobiledevice project34.  Libimobiledevice is a cross-platform softare protocol 
library.  It provides tools to communicate with iOS devices.   The downside to this, 
however, is that its services have not been looked at since its creation in 2009.  
 Packet sniffers are on iDevices, and are active on every iOS device, under 
com.apple.mobile.pcapd35.  Sadly, there is no indicator to the user that this is running. 
The big question, then, is why are packet sniffers on iOS Devices? There are many 
theories as to why they are present. One such theory is so that developers are testing their 
applications.  Zdziarski slightly debunks this because the sniffers are enabled on devices 
on non-developer mode.  Apple’s reasoning for having packet sniffers on the device is to 
help with troubleshooting and diagnosing issues with applications. With the new iOS 8, 
this ability is restricted to USB interface.  Even through there is some controversy on this, 
it is still useful to know for examiners, so they could use packet sniffers to their 
advantage.  
 The last thing that advanced logical acquisition talks about is house_arrest. Apple 
states that house_arrest is used by iTunes to transfer documents to and from the device.36 
Zdziarksi, however, believes that it is used to copy documents to and from third party 
application.  This allows access to the preference folders.  The preference folders can be 
33 (Fitzpatrick, 2013) 
34 (LibiMobileDevice, 2009) 
35 (Apple, 2014) 
36 (Apple, 2014)  
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useful because it provides storage for Facebook and photos. Not only this, but 
house_arrest can assist in recovering deleted messages.  
 Theories as to why these methods exist are discussed in the end of the 
presentation, as well as Zdziarski explaining why they are not viable. For instance, a 
theory is that it is used for developers for debugging.  Zdziarski states that developers do 
not need to bypass backup encryption and do not need to access sensitive content in order 
to debug.37  
PowerPoint Presentation for Week Ten 
Slide 1 
iOS Device Forensics
Advanced iOS Security
Week 10
 
Slide 2 Advanced Logical Acquisition –
File_relay
 Are there backdoors in iOS?  
◦ Or Better yet, is there a way to bypass iTunes 
backup encryption?
◦ Zdziarski did research on how this can be 
done.
 http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_P
oints_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf
◦ He found that file_relay bypasses the backup 
encryption. 
 
37 (Zdziarski, 2014) 
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Slide 3 Advanced Logical Acquisition –
File_Relay
 The full name to find the file_relay is the 
following:
◦ Com.apple.mobile.file_relay
 According to Zdziarski, this is the biggest 
forensic trove of intelligence on the device.
 Where can you find it?
◦ /usr/libexec/mobile_file_relay
 The file_relay transmits large amount of raw 
file data.  It is in a compressed cpio archive. 
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf  
Slide 4 Advanced Logical Acquisition – File 
Relay
 File_Relay can be used to give very personal 
data that is on the device.  This can include:
◦ Email accounts
◦ Facebook accounts
◦ GPS logs
◦ HFSMeta
 This is a sparse image of the file system on the device.  
This can include timestamps, filenames, sizes, and 
creation dates of all files. 
◦ Photos
◦ UserDatabases
 This can include the SMS database, calendar, address 
book, etc. 
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf  
Slide 5 Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Pairing Authentication
 To access Undocumented Services, 
examiners can go through lockdownd, 
which is what is required in pairing 
authentication. 
◦ Pairing is a trusted relationship with another 
device.  A computer is granted permission to 
access the device.   
◦ Whenever you plug in your iPhone into a 
computer, you are allowing the computer 
access to the device, allowing a pairing to 
happen. 
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf  
Slide 6 Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Pairing Authentication
 According to Zdziarski,  Juice Jacking can be used to 
establish pairing, and that can be a bad thing.  So what 
is juice jacking?
◦ For the device, the power supply and the data pass over 
the same cable.  This means that whatever cable you use 
to charge your device, can also be the same cable that 
syncs your data. 
◦ This can sometimes allow a user to gain access your 
device while charging. 
◦ The definition provided by howtogeek.com is the 
following:
 “leveraging the USB data/power cable to illegitimately access the 
phone’s data and/or inject malicious code onto the device is 
known as juice jacking.” 
 http://www.howtogeek.com/166497/htg-explains-what-is-juice-jacking-and-
how-worried-should-you-be/
http://www.howtogeek.com/166497/htg-explains-what-is-juice-jacking-and-how-worried-should-you-be/
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf  
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Slide 7 Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Pairing Authentication
 This method also bypasses backup encryption and 
can be accessed through USB and wireless.  
 Almost all lockdownd protocols have been 
documented in the libimobiledevice project. 
◦ Libimobiledevice is a cross-platform software 
protocol library which provides tools to 
communicate with iOS devices, according to their 
website. 
◦ The website that has some information about the 
project can be found at libimobiledevice.org and has 
been around since 2009.
 A note to make would be that many of these services haven’t 
been looked at since 2009, according to Zdziarski. 
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf
http://www.libimobiledevice.org/
 
Slide 8 Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Packet Sniffers on device?
 Com.apple.pcapd immediately starts 
libpcap on devices.  This does not require 
developer mode and is active on every 
iOS device.
◦ Libpcap is a implemented pcap (packet 
capture) used by Unix-like systems. 
 There is no visual indication to the user 
that pack sniffer is running on the device. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pcap
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf
 
Slide 9 Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Packet Sniffers on device?
 So why are there packet sniffers running 
on iOS Devices?
◦ A popular theory is that developers are 
testing their applications. 
 However, Zdziarski does mention that the sniffers 
are enabled on non-devleoper mode devices as well. 
◦ Zdziarski does not know exactly why packet 
sniffers are on devices, and there are many 
theories as to why they are there.
◦ Knowing this, however, can be useful for 
examiners during cases. 
http://news.yahoo.com/iphone-may-rigged-spy-
183943399.html;_ylt=A0LEVyuXPE1UzLQAGYpXNyoA;_ylu=X3oDMTEzMWp0Z3ZhBHNlYwNzcgRwb3MDNgRjb2xvA2JmMQR2dGlkA1ZJUDUwMl8x
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf
 
Slide 10 Advanced Logical Acquisition –
Packet Sniffers on device?
 According to apple, 
com.apple.mobile.pcapd, this is useful for 
troubleshooting and diagnosing issues 
with apps on the device.  It also helps 
with VPN connections.
◦ In iOS 8, it’s ability is restricted to USB 
inferface and can’t be used over wireless. 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT6331  
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Slide 11 Advanced Logical Acquisition –
house_arrest
 According to apple,  
com.apple.mobile.house_arrest is used by 
iTunes to transfer documents to and from 
the device.  This can be for apps that 
support this feature. 
 According to Zdziarski…
◦ House_arrest was used to copy documents 
from and to third party applications. 
◦ It doesn’t permit the copies to happen 
through the GUI. 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT6331
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf
 
Slide 12 Advanced Logical Acquisition –
house_arrest
 These services allow access to the 
Library, Caches, Cookies and Preferences 
folders. 
 The preference folders are important to 
note.  Why?
◦ The folders provided sensitive account 
storage.  This can include: 
 Facebook Caches
 Photos
 Twitter
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf  
Slide 13 Advanced Logical Acquisition –
house_arrest
 Zdzarski did a good example of how 
house_arrest can be used to gain 
information on a device.
◦ With Twitter, house_arrest can be able to see 
the most recent timeline and recent photos 
from a stream. 
◦ Also, house_arrest allows access to the 
private message database as well as 
recovering deleted messages. 
◦ Provides a screenshot of the last use of 
Twitter.
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf  
Slide 14 
Advanced Logical Acquisition
 There are many theories as to why these 
methods are available, but Zdzarski has 
seemingly proven that these theories are 
not correct. 
◦ You can see the theories on the link provided. 
 http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_P
oints_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf
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Slide 15 
Advanced Logical Acquisition
 Some of these theories include and proven wrong 
by Zdzarski:
◦ iTunes or Xcode use them? – No
 iTunes respects the backup encryption.  Also, iTunes only uses 
house_arrest to access documents, and does not use file relay 
or pcap. 
◦ Used for Genius Bar or Apple Support? – No
 Data is too raw a format, which also can’t be put back on the 
phone.  Also, the data is to personal for tech support. 
◦ Used for Developers for Debugging? – No
 Developer tools live on the developers image.  They are only 
available with developer mode is being used. Also, developers 
don’t need to bypass backup encryption and does not need to 
access the sensitive content. 
http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms_Moved.pdf  
Chapter 12 – Week Eleven: Forensic Reporting and Presentation 
 The last week of presentations for students covers Forensic Reporting and 
Presentation.  This is important because examiners need to know how to properly 
document their findings in cases, as well as presenting said findings to others or in court. 
A forensic report is a report of what tools were used during the investigation, as well as 
what was found.  The report can go to supervisors, clients, attorneys or the Judge and 
Jury.  
 As stated before, investigators or examiners should put what steps were taken to 
gain the evidence.  It is important to note the order in which they handled the evidence. 
This creates a timeline that the evidence has gone through, which can help assist with 
showing a chain of custody. 38 
 There are many websites that can help one create and see a forensic report.  
Another important thing to do when reporting is to take notes of what is done. This can 
include screenshots, bookmarking evidence or making notes through a digital recorder or 
hand writing them.39  Reports need to be detailed to show how one got the data.   
38 (Christly) 
39 (Garcia, 2010) 
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 As important forensic reporting is, communicating properly with others about the 
evidence is equally important.  According to Shayne Sherman in his document A digital 
forensic practitioner’s guide to giving evidence in a court of law, the use of PowerPoints 
and charts are very useful.  What an examiner needs to remember is that not everyone 
may know technical terms, and using PowerPoints and charts can help others understand 
the information.  
 The week’s presentation concludes with looking into what makes iOS analysis 
‘forensic’.  For this, the lecture refers back to week one’s look into technical analysis and 
forensic examinations. One must remember that technical analysis is how the examiner 
retrieved the evidence where a forensic examination is how one interprets the evidence to 
determine innocence or guilt.  
PowerPoint Presentation for Week Eleven 
Slide 1 
iOS Device Forensics
Forensic Reporting and Presentation
Week 11
 
Slide 2 
Forensic Reporting
 A forensic report is used for many purposes.  
However, the reports are mainly used to show 
proof of what or what wasn’t found.  In the case 
of this class, it would be an iDevice. 
 A Forensic Report also is a way to present 
findings in a manner that other can understand. 
 These reports can go to a number of people: 
◦ Supervisors
◦ Client
◦ Attorney
◦ Judge / Jury
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Slide 3 
Forensic Reporting
 The investigator should put everything 
that he or she did to process the 
evidence.  The notes should be in 
chronological order to establish a timeline 
that the evidence went through. 
◦ Note that this should include the time zone 
that the evidence was processed in.  This will 
help verify the time stamped items.
 The report needs to show what tools 
(Software and Hardware) were used. 
http://www.eteraconsulting.com/12/07/forensic-reporting-how-it-works-and-why-it-important
 
Slide 4 
Forensic Reporting
 What you should do for good reporting
◦ Takes Notes! Some tips for good note taking:
 Screenshots
 Bookmarking evidence 
 Use Built-in logging or reporting options
 Use of a digital recorder vs hand written notes
◦ Your report should include:
 Case Summary
 Forensic Acquisition & Exam Preparation
 Findings
 Report (forensic analysis)
 Conclusion
http://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2010/08/19/digital-forensics-reporting-casenotes-walkthroughreview/
 
Slide 5 
Forensic Reporting
 It is very important to show the “Chain of 
Custody” in the report. 
◦ Chain of Custody - The movement and location 
of physical evidence from the time it is obtained 
until the time it is presented in court.
 http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/chain+of+custody
http://www.eteraconsulting.com/12/07/forensic-reporting-how-it-works-and-why-it-important
 
Slide 6 
Forensic Reporting
 A good site to help with writing a 
Forensic Report:
◦ http://digital-
forensics.sans.org/blog/2010/08/25/intro-
report-writing-digital-forensics/
◦ http://digital-
forensics.sans.org/blog/2013/02/26/report-
writing-digital-forensics-part-ii
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Slide 7 
Communication Strategies
 You have to remember that the reader of 
the report may not know all the technical 
terms that an examiner would know. 
 Be careful not to over simplify the ability 
of the jury to understand the evidence.
 The use of PowerPoints and Charts help 
with understanding the material.  
 A Digital Forensic Practitioner’s Guide to giving 
evidence in a court of law, Sherman
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/forensic-evidence-in-court.pdf  
Slide 8 
What makes iOS Analysis ‘forensic’?
 Lets think back on Technical Analysis vs 
‘Forensic’ examination back in week one. 
◦ Technical Analysis is used to authenticate data 
through explanation of the technical features 
of data and future usage.  
◦ A ‘Forensic’ Examination attempts to 
understand the evidence that is found from 
the acquisitions.
 
Slide 9 
What makes iOS Analysis ‘forensic’?
 For technical Analysis, this is how the 
examiner would explain how the evidence 
was retrieved.  
◦ REMEMBER! The jury does not know a lot of 
the technical terms that examiners do.  
However, try to explain what you did so the 
jury can better understand how the examiner 
got to that conclusion. 
 
Slide 10 
What makes iOS Analysis ‘forensic’?
 A forensic examination, as stated in week 
1, is more then just the technical data that 
is found. 
◦ It is the ability to understand what the 
evidence means in terms of the case. It allows 
the examiner to show whether or not the 
evidence proves guilt or innocence. 
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Slide 11 
Reminder!
 For Graduate Students,  next week starts 
the time to turn in your paper.  
◦ You have until the last day of class, but you 
also have the option to turn it in early. 
 Next  week we will discuss the final 
project.
 
Chapter 13 – Weeks Twelve through Fifteen: The Final Project 
 The remaining time for the semester will be spent on the student’s working on a 
project using what they have learned in the class.  The first phase of the project is giving 
the students a backup of a device containing evidence of a guilty party.  The students then 
are encouraged to work either individually or in groups to retrieve the evidence. By the 
end of week fourteen, students or groups will turn in a report of their findings based on 
the backup that was provided.  Week fifteen will be reserved for the student or group to 
present the project to others in a mock trail setting. Student will be encouraged to dress 
professionally, as if they were presenting to a real trial.  
The Backup Provided for Students 
 The backup that was prepared contains two fake parties, Wayne Tarsle and Mark 
Bytes. Emails were set up for the each party, as well as an apple ID for each.  Emails, as 
well as iMessages, were exchanged between the two fake individuals, setting up a 
scenario where Wayne sends evidence to Mark in exchange for money.  The evidence in 
question was two plain sheets of paper with “Evidence #1” and “Evidence #2” written on 
them.  The pictures of these sheets of paper were then sent to each respective email 
address.  This was all done on an Apple iPhone 4s.  
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Chapter 14 – Conclusion 
 At the end of the semester, students should have a basic understanding of 
iOS device forensics, as well as some key concepts in this field.  The field is 
constantly growing and changing with each new update and release that iOS has.  
This makes it difficult to find accurate information on this subject, especially with 
a forensic standpoint.  Thankfully, there are plenty of internet sources, like the 
Apple Developer Library, that can have this information. This also shows that 
having developing a class for interested individuals can be beneficial as well.   
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